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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last two decades many countries have shifted provision, supervision,
resource allocation and funding decisions of many publicly provided services from
central to local governments. The rationale behind decentralization reforms is rarely
economic and typically political, such as the challenge of ethnic and geographic diversity
in Africa; the deepening of democratization in Latin America and East Asia; the
transition from a command system to a market system in Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union; the need to improve delivery of local services to large populations in the
centralized countries of East Asia, and such (see Shah, 1998, for more about motivations
for such a change). Whatever the real driving force, almost all decentralization reforms
have been applauded by academics, international donors, and pundits on the grounds that
they would improve the well-being of the people by empowering local voters to change
the kind, quantities and qualities of the public services they receive from local authorities.
The fact that most research on local public goods has been inspired by the
observations on developed countries has troubled many development economists, since
most institutions whose existence are taken for granted in this literature are often very
weak in less developed countries. Recent anecdotal evidence has suggested that
decentralization, if undertaken without sufficient planning or strengthening of appropriate
institutions, may lead to outcomes that are potentially worse than centralized systems,
leading instead to fragmented planning, inadequate consideration or funding of recurrent
2expenditures, local capture, or under-provision of certain types of services. As
decentralization reforms have become the centerpiece of international donor
organizations, it is critical, both in theory and in practice, to understand the factors that
determine the allocation of publicly-provided local services in developing nations.
In the first part of this dissertation, we have developed a simple analytical model
that highlights a vicious cycle faced by many developing countries, where local
governments’ efforts to provide public services to their jurisdictions are usually
hampered by widespread corruption. When publicly provided goods are not of high
quality, the wealthy can switch to private alternatives. Their exit weakens the influence of
citizen voice over politicians and leaves the poor as the only constituents with a stake in
local governance. As the civic control over local governments weakens, corruption in
public offices becomes even more pervasive.
Our model highlights two conditions for the success of decentralization reforms:
(i) effective oversight – in the form of hierarchical accountability mechanisms or citizen
voice – to prevent the capture of local governments by the special interest, and (ii)
establishing institutions that spread the costs and/or benefits of governance over the
society so that everyone has a stake in the success of local governments. Those
institutions may be in the form of local revenue mobilization (e.g. use of income tax or
property tax rather than transfers from central government to finance public services) or
subsidies to the poor that help them to use “exit” mechanisms if necessary (e.g. school
vouchers or public health insurance that subsidizes the use of private health-care
providers if public services are not accessible or at desired quality).
3We have tested the implications of our theoretical model in the Philippines. The
Philippines is a particularly appropriate case for four reasons. First, local government
units in the Philippines have significant autonomy and responsibility in the provision of
basic services to their jurisdictions. Second, decentralization reforms in the last decade
have ensured that the responsibilities of local governments are matched with local
authority to raise revenue from local sources. Third, the devolution of responsibilities to
local governments in the Philippines is not only administrative and fiscal, but also
political. Finally, there exist private alternatives in education and health care so that the
“exit” option is feasible.
We did not find a direct link between local financing and the quantity of publicly
provided local goods. It may be possible that the benefits of local financing is usually
based on some form of a Tiebout mechanism which may not be applicable to developing
countries due to underdeveloped capital markets and constraints on household mobility.
But, we found that one mechanism that may strengthen the success of local financing is
political participation of citizens. Although neither voter turnout nor local financing alone
was strong in general, their interaction was quite significant. Local taxation may also
have an indirect impact on policy choice through its positive influence on a person’s
involvement in voice mechanisms. Households are more likely to participate in barangay
(townhall) meetings with public officials if local public spending is primarily financed by
local sources rather than transfers from the central government. In addition, we also
found that by spreading the cost of corruption to the whole community, local taxation
may be an important policy instrument to support good governance in the public sector.
Another finding is that keeping the wealthier segments of communities in the
4public system as users of publicly provided services is critical for the success of local
governments. They would be more active in voice mechanisms (such as participating in
meetings with local public officials) if they use public services. Their mobilization and
participation in political activities would create benefits for the whole community,
because they have more ability to raise their voice against public officials as compared to
the less wealthy. In this context, we found that private alternatives in the health and
education sectors may even have an adverse effect on local governments, if the use of the
exit option is confined to the wealthy and thereby private alternatives effectively shield
these households from the mismanagement and corruption in local governments. In the
Philippines, however, the teacher staffing norm established by the central government has
provided an indirect link between school enrollment and promotion of school principals
through a Niskanen-mechanism (i.e. budget-maximizing bureaucrats) rather than Tiebout.
We found that this mechanism, coupled with availability of private schools to large
segments of the population has created an institutional environment where school
administrators, facing competitive pressure from private schools, have been motivated to
raise the quality of education, at least in secondary schools.
We also found, however, decentralization is not a panacea. Communities with
more acute wealth inequalities are more likely to have less publicly provided goods,
because the friction between the have and have-not is transformed into a conflict between
public good users and private good users. When this conflict is coupled with undue
influence of the local elite, there could be a bias in favor of public services used by the
wealthy.
5Chapter 2
Literature Survey
It is quite common for many governments to use public resources to provide
services, such as education, healthcare, transportation, security, and housing, to the public
even though many of these services have privately available counterparts. State
involvement in the provision of such services is usually based on the existence of
externalities that cannot be internalized by the private sector or households1, equity
concerns2, information asymmetries between consumers and service providers3
(particularly in the health sector), and finally, fixed costs involved in their production that
                                                
1 For example, the benefits of vaccination against infectious diseases are shared, accruing not only
to the immunized community but also to those around it. Education of children contributes to accumulation
of human capital and lifts social and economic prosperity of the whole society. Ignoring such positive
externalities yields sub-optimal pricing and spending decisions.
2 Households may not have access to credit market to make optimal inter-temporal decisions about
the health and education of themselves or their children.
3 Consumers may have limited information about the current and future benefits of various
medical services. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems may impair the functioning of insurance
system causing disappearance of the market for some types of insurance (Arrow, 1963; Rotschild and
Stiglitz, 1976).
6prevent the emergence of a private market operating under competitive conditions4.
There is a wide range of research in the public finance literature identifying the
types of services which are the best candidates for government provision and discussing
the optimal sharing of responsibilities among different tiers of government in their
provision5. With the recent popularity of decentralization around the globe, in particular
among many developing countries, decision making authority for provision, supervision,
resource allocation and funding decisions of many publicly provided services has shifted
from central to local governments.
The decision on how to allocate public funds among various services is a political
outcome. The literature on local public economics has studied a range of factors critical
in this political process, ranging from electoral preferences, special interest groups, exit
(jurisdictional choice – “voting by feet” - and using services provided by the private
sector), and its financial consequences.  Despite a wide range of research in this field,
most empirical studies are confined to experiences of developed countries. As
decentralization reforms have become the centerpiece of international donor
                                                
4 The marginal cost of adding another student to a classroom, admitting another patient to a
hospital or providing transportation services to one more commuter is lower than the average cost. This
may cause a monopolist market structure in the private sector.
5 Assigning responsibilities to the appropriate tier of government usually follows the
decentralization theorem, introduced by Oates (1972), which states that if the benefits of particular services
are largely confined to local jurisdictions, the level and mix of such services should vary according to local
preferences and hence, they should be decided by each jurisdiction.
7organizations, it is critical, both in theory and in practice, to understand the factors that
influence the allocation of publicly-provided local services in less developed nations.
Earlier attempts in explaining the demand side of this process were centered
around the preferences of the electorate, in particular the median voter who casts the
decisive vote (Bowen, 1943; Downs, 1957; Black, 1948; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962;
also see for example Mueller, 1989, for a review of empirical evidence). One
complication with dual provision (public and private) of some services is that preferences
are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives (Stiglitz, 1974). Non-
single-peakedness occurs because a household may be induced to use the public
alternative only if its quality passes a threshold. The implication of non-single-
peakedness is that a voting equilibrium may not exist, and, even if an equilibrium does
exist, the standard approach (invocation of the median-voter theorem) does not generally
apply to characterize that equilibrium (Epple and Romano, 1996; Glomm and Ravikumar,
1998).
Later, the influence of special interest groups over public agenda has attracted
quite a bit of interest among researchers. The notion that different groups within society
compete for resources is the centerpiece of many models of distributive politics (e.g.
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2000, among others). There is also a long list of empirical studies reporting
intergenerational conflicts where the elderly tend to vote against public spending on
education (Button, 1992; Vinovskis, 1993; Poterba, 1997, 1998). The support for publicly
provided goods tends to be lower in ethnically divided communities (Rubinfeld and
Shapiro, 1989; Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser, 1993; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly,
81999). People have discriminatory community preferences where they care only about the
welfare of others within their ethnic community and choose lower public goods when
they are mainly used by other ethnic groups. Examining the variation of publicly
provided goods among districts of Indian states Betancourt and Gleason (2000) also
found that elected state governments discriminate against scheduled castes and Muslim
minority.
Heterogeneity of citizens creates an allocation problem for publicly provided
goods, because whenever the median voter decides there would inevitably be winners and
losers. It is not surprising that fiscal federalism literature, in its early stages, focused on
the question of allocative efficiency, i.e. matching public resources with consumer
preferences (Tiebout, 1956; Stigler, 1957; Oates, 1972; Musgrave, 1983). Tiebout’s
solution of the heterogeneity problem was that people can sort themselves into
communities that provide the public goods they want. Just like a utility-maximizing
individual who chooses the optimal mix of private goods, taxpayers can also move to
areas where public services more closely match their preferences. Decentralized
authorities overseeing various local jurisdictions would compete by offering different
standards of services and by imposing different tax burdens. This hypothesis challenged
Samuelson’s conjecture that (local) public goods could not be allocated efficiently.
The conditions that ensure this conclusion, however, are quite restrictive: Full
mobility and knowledge of voters, availability of a large number of jurisdictions offering
a range of options, absence of scale economies in producing the public good, absence of
spillovers, etc. When all these limitations are considered, the smooth working of Tiebout
mechanism may require the number of jurisdictions be as large as the number of citizens
9(Bewley, 1981). Despite the criticism on theoretical grounds, the empirical studies using
aggregate data usually confirm that voters tend to vote with their feet (Miller, 1981 on
Los Angeles; Munley, 1982 on New York; Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982 on Detroit;
Brueckner, 1982 on Massachusetts; also see Rubinfeld, 1987, and Oates, 1999, for a
review of the literature). Micro-level data is less conclusive, although school quality and
tax rates appear to be significant determinants of jurisdictional choice (Percy and
Hawkins, 1992 on the United States).
Tiebout’s argument, in its pure form, implies that mobility of voters is sufficient
to ensure efficient allocation of public resources. Later, a similar argument has been
applied to the supply side as well to explain how voting-by-feet can motivate local
governments by triggering competition among jurisdictions and achieve productive
efficiency (producing goods/services at the production cost frontier). It has also been
extended to involve additional mechanisms (such as property values and private
investments) that establish a link between local revenue mobilization and
(mis)governance in local governments.
 The “neo-Tiebout” argument on productive efficiency is based on
interjurisdictional competition, where local governments compete with each other to
attract (or retain) households and capital to their jurisdictions. If households can choose
among a large number of districts, they would tend to favor districts that produce higher
quality of public services for a given local tax liability or, equivalently, have lower local
tax liability for a given level of quality. Hence, mobility of labor and capital forces local
governments to act like cost-minimizing entrepreneurs and achieve productive efficiency
(Hoxby, 1996). Experiences of jurisdictions make it possible to compare the
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performances of local governments in terms of the services they provide and the tax-
prices they charge (Shleifer, 1985; Oates, 1999). Evidence from the United States
(Peltzman, 1987, 1990, 1992; Besley and Case, 1995a, 1995b) supports the effectiveness
of “yardstick competition” to motivate politicians. Even with the presence of fiscal
disparities, interjurisdictional competition is applauded on (production) efficiency
grounds as long as “the federal government has fulfilled the redistributive function”
(Oates and Schwab, 1991).
“Yardstick competition” does not have to be resolved in the voting box. Even if
voice options are limited, the quality and tax price of public services would be capitalized
by property values, rewarding efficient governments with a bigger tax base6. It is
frequently reported that local financing of public services leads to better productive
efficiency (Husted and Kenny, 1997; Hoxby, 1999a, 2000a. When local funding is
replaced by more central funding (which means state funding in the case of the United
States) local support for public services declines, because central funding imposes
                                                
6 Hoxby (1999a) summarizes the rationale behind contemporary Tiebout mechanism as follows:
“Consider a school district whose quality-for-cost rises, resulting in increased demand and property values.
Higher property values either bring an autonomous increase in school budgets as the property tax collects
more money, which rewards school producers directly, or allow a reduction in the rate of property tax rate,
which offers potential political rewards to school administrators…. Local school finance can be viewed as a
real world version of the optimal mechanism for maximizing the production efficiency of schools. In fact,
what is prescribed is not just local property tax-based finance, but also a structure of a local politics that
causes budgets to increase semi automatically with contemporary increases in property values and that
rewards school administrators for lowering property tax.”
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redistribution among jurisdictions (Evans, Murray, and Schwab, 1995; Figlio, 1997;
Hoxby, 1999b).
Another competitive pressure on local governments comes from the private
sector. Households may stop using public services by switching to private alternatives
without moving to another jurisdiction. In the education literature, in particular, many
advocates of school choice have argued that the presence of private schools places
competitive pressure on public schools, and thereby improve their performance
(Friedman, 1955; Chubb and Moe, 1990). Responding to inequality concerns, choice
proponents have also proposed the selective issuance of vouchers, where each person
would be given a non-transferable education voucher to be used to buy education from
among competing institutions (Friedman, 1962). The empirical results concerning
competitive effects between private and public schools are mixed. Some find support for
positive competitive effects (Couch, Shughart, and Williams, 1993 on North Carolina;
Hoxby, 1994 on the United States), while other studies do not reveal significant
improvement from competition (Geller, Sjoquist and Walker, 2001 on Georgia).
Peer effects also have been of interest to social scientists. In a  typical model of
peer effects an individual’s outcome on a certain variable is affected by the average of
his/her peers’ outcomes on that variable. For instance, a student’s reading score would be
affected by the reading scores of his/her classmates. Of course, there may exist negative
spillovers, such as those caused by class disruption. Externalities inherent in peer effects
may not be internalized by households and direct intervention of the government may be
necessary. The education literature, for example, has showed that if peer effects exist at
school, then  a school finance system that encourages an efficient distribution of peers
12
will make human capital investments more efficient (Nechyba, 1996; Epple and Romano,
1998). Similar arguments are made regarding the organization of local government,
which may encourage or discourage an efficient distribution of peer effects within
neighborhoods (Benabou, 1996). Peer effects also play a prominent
role in arguments for and against school choice programs
(Hoxby, 2000a). Given the high policy stakes, there has been
considerable interest in measuring the extent of peer
effects in primary and secondary education. There is now a
small but rapidly growing empirical literature that attempts
to gauge the impact of peers on individual student
achievement in the United States. Hoxby (2000b), Hanushek et
al (2003), and Stiefel, Schwartz and Zabel (2004) all
exploit large administrative databases to estimate the
magnitude of peer effects in American public schools, yet
obtain mixed results on their significance.
The fact that most research on decentralization has been inspired by the
observations on developed countries, in particular the United States, has troubled many
development economists, because most political, social and financial institutions whose
existence are taken for granted in those studies are often very weak in less developed
countries.
The effectiveness of voice mechanisms to motivate (elected) local officials is the
most frequently cited criticism (Chubb, 1985; Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1995; Litvack,
Ahmad, and Bird, 1998). In many developing countries local elections are usually
decided on the basis of personal, tribal, or political party loyalties. Presence of powerful
local elites hinders participation of the poor to the political process. Moreover, the
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decisions on how to allocate public resources or the provision (type, quantity, quality) of
many public services are typically beyond the control of local governments. Local
resources usually constitute a small portion of local expenditures and transfers from the
central government come with many administrative restrictions. It is difficult, therefore,
to assume that the voter holds local authorities responsible for the taxation, which is
centralized, and the programs, which are only partially decentralized (Peterson, 1994).
Still, some empirical evidence has demonstrated that decentralization may offer
promising results even under less than perfect conditions. Fiszbein (1997) based upon a
review of political decentralization in Colombia concluded that competition for political
office opened the door for responsible and innovative leadership that in turn became the
driving force behind capacity building and improved public performance at the local
level. Gray-Molina et. al. (1999) found that misuse of public funds in municipal health
service providers in Bolivia declines significantly in places where citizens participate
directly into the political process by attending health board meetings. A detailed study of
investment sector-by-sector in Bolivia shows that decentralization reforms have increased
the sensitivity of public investment decisions to local needs (Faguet, 2000). local
financing, coupled with political devolution, has led to productive efficiency in countries
like Indonesia and the Philippines (James, King, and Suryadi, 1996, and Jimenez and
Paqueo, 1996, respectively). Porto and Porto (2000) found that local elections in
Argentina are not mere rehearsal of national elections and voters pay attention to the
performance of local governments. Examining the local elections in India Khemani
(2000) reached a similar conclusion. Finally, using a survey of public officials in Bolivia,
Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Gurgur (2004) found a positive link between existence of
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consumer complaint and feedback mechanisms and quality and accessibility of public
services.
The constraints in the developing world against Tiebout mechanism are also
daunting. The assumption of voter mobility has little relevance in developing countries,
especially in rural areas. People are often less mobile due to underdeveloped credit
market, and when they do move, it is usually related to job prospects, family ties, or some
environmental devastation (Prud'homme, 1995; Bardhan, 1997).  It is also questionable
that there exist a large number of jurisdictions in less developed countries that offer a
wide range of options. If exit options are limited, losing tax base would not be a credible
threat to motivate public officials, even when local spending is primarily financed by
local revenue sources.
Availability of alternative service providers in the private sector and the extent to
its motivating effect on local governments is also questionable. For some services
alternative suppliers in the private sector may simply not exist. In other cases, such as
education and health care, private suppliers may exist, but their accessibility may be
limited due to price or capacity considerations (e.g. see Azfar, Kähkönen and Meagher,
2001, for survey results on Uganda). Several factors may undermine the competitive
pressure from private suppliers. Private schools may not be substitute for public schools
due to religious, ethnic or socioeconomic considerations. There may not be sufficient
private alternatives to have an impact on institutional performance. Local governments
may not care about the loss of resources that comes with lower enrollments or less use of
local public health clinics if their personal income and working conditions are not
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affected. They may even prefer less demand for publicly provided services due to
overcrowding and capacity constraints.
The exit option may even have adverse effects on local governance, if that option
is only available to the wealthy. Public choice literature has long recognized that people’s
willingness to participate in political initiatives (such as contacting or petitioning of
elected representatives and bureaucrats, attending official and unofficial meetings, public
protests, etc.) and community activities (e.g. participation in design, construction or
operation of public projects or services, or involvement in quasi-formal organizations,
such as local councils, teacher-parent associations, etc.) varies according to their
perception of how much benefit they would receive from their effort (Hirschman, 1980;
North, 1990, Leighley, 1995). When some groups, typically the wealthy, exit the public
system by switching to a private alternative, they no longer support the funding of
publicly provided services or involve in community based initiatives to improve their
quality. Yet, there is an emerging literature that highlights how critical community
participation is in improving the quality of public services in many developing countries
(e.g. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993, on Italy; Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett, 1995;
Sara and Katz, 1998, on India; Isham and Kähkönen, 2002, on India; Alatas, Pritchett,
and Wetterberg, 2002, on Indonesia).
Moreover, availability of an exit option in some services may distort allocative
efficiency of public resources and cause incidence bias in favor of the wealthy and well-
connected. Wealthy individuals staying in the public system would support the allocation
of more resources on public services they use, such as tertiary education or curative care
as opposed to public services they do not use, such as primary education and public
16
health goods (e.g. immunizations, health education, family planning). Evidence of this
phenomenon is reported by Schwartz, Racelis, and Guilkey (2000) and Jeppsson (2001)
on Uganda, by Birn, Zimmerman, and Garfield (2000) on Nicaragua, and by Akin,
Hutchinson, Strumpf (2001) on the Philippines. As a result the public spending in many
developing countries is skewed heavily in favor of public services used by the top income
quintile (World Bank, 2003). This bias is even more prevalent in countries with high
income inequalities (Gradstein, 2003).
Another challenge facing developing countries is widespread corruption and
mismanagement in the public sector, which distorts both the allocation of public
resources and their efficiency. In fact, the lack of a robust relationship between public
spending and outcomes reported in the literature (e.g. Hanushek, 1995 across developing
countries; Hanushek, 1996 on the United States; Filmer and Pritchett, 1999 on India) may
be due to differences in the efficacy of spending stemming from corruption in local
governments (Pritchett, 1996). Decentralization, particularly in the absence of well-
functioning democratic mechanisms, could lower local citizen welfare through a higher
degree of corruption or “leakage” of resources (Prud’homme, 1995; Collins and Green,
1994; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2001 and 2002; Gurgur and Shah, 2003; Azfar and
Gurgur, 2004). This creates a vicious cycle in less developed countries suffering from
widespread corruption in the public sector: corruption hinders the quality, quantity, and
accessibility of publicly provided services. That, in turn, pushes the wealthy to the private
alternatives and leaves the poor as the only constituents who have a stake in local
governance but with little influence over local politicians. As the civic control over local
governments weakens, corruption in public offices becomes even more pervasive. Such a
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cycle is less likely to be observed in developed countries, where Tiebout’s “voting-by-
feet” functions relatively well (thereby keeping redistributive politics in check) and local
politicians are more sensitive to the electorate (so that the plea of the poor for more/better
public services is more likely to be heard).
To the best of our knowledge only Reinikka and Svensson (2001) have linked,
albeit implicitly, the poor performance of public schools to the flight of wealthy
households to private schools. They introduced a model to explain how households and
teachers in public schools form parent-teacher associations and bargain with the district
bureaucracy to minimize the leakage of funds in their school budget. The amount of
public funds reaching public schools depends on the bargaining strength of the school,
which in turn depends on the wealth of parents. Empirical results from a survey of public
primary schools in Uganda showed that schools with relatively wealthy parents are more
likely to afford the costs of acquiring information and initiating protests. As a result these
schools are more successful to prevent leakage of funds.
The public finance literature, in particular the literature on fiscal federalism, has
shed light on various mechanisms that shape the allocation of publicly provided services
– ranging from Tiebout’s voting-by-feet, Niskanen’s budget maximizing bureaucrat,
interjurisdictional competition, electoral preferences (represented by the median voter)
the influence of special interest groups, and so on. Existence of some, if not most, of thee
institutions is questionable in less developed countries. This does not necessarily rule out
the relevance of the current literature, but necessitates new studies to advance our
understanding of the political economy of publicly provided services in less developed
nations.
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Chapter 3
The Model
3.1 Introduction
In the last two decades many countries have shifted provision, supervision,
resource allocation and funding decisions of many publicly provided services from
central to local governments. Whatever the real driving force, almost all decentralization
reforms have been applauded by academics, international donors, and pundits on the
grounds that they would improve the well-being of the people by empowering local
voters to change the kind, quantities and qualities of the public health services they
receive from their local authorities.
In spite of the strong faith placed in decentralization, recent studies have
suggested that decentralization, if undertaken without sufficient planning or strengthening
of appropriate institutions, may lead to outcomes that are potentially worse than
centralized systems, leading instead to fragmented planning, inadequate consideration or
funding of recurrent expenditures, local capture, or under-provision of certain types of
services (Akin et al. 2000, Jeppsson 2001, Schwartz et al. 2001).
In this chapter we aim to highlight two fundamental problems inherent in
decentralization process. First, even if local communities are empowered, this may not
necessarily guarantee that empowerment of each individual occurs at the same time –
some individuals may end up with capturing more influence than others. “Bringing the
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government closer to the people” (the premise of decentralization) reduces the “barrier of
entry” that separates politicians and special interest groups and makes it easier to get
connected with the public officials. Thanks to their wealth, education, and personal status
in the community, the rich can more easily pay "the fixed cost" to establish such
connections and influence government to advance their interests.
Another potential problem is that the power may not be transferred solely to
people who have a stake in good governance – certain groups may be able to isolate
themselves from mismanagement of local governments, reducing incentives to hold
public officials accountable for their misdeeds. When publicly provided goods are not of
high quality, the rich usually have the financial power to turn to private market  provided
that they can find (perfect) substitutes (such as private schools over public schools,
private health care providers over public ones). Having shielded themselves from the
public sector, they would neither care about mismanagement in local governments nor be
involved in community-based initiatives to improve the quality of public goods. That
leaves the poor as the sole user of public services and the only constituent with a stake in
local governance. Migration of the rich to the private market weakens the influence of
citizen voice over politicians, because these individuals are usually the only ones with
enough political and financial clout to make their voice heard in the political arena.
Comparing the implications of the model with existing literature, the most striking
contrast is in the impact of private institutions. Empirical studies on developed countries
have focused on how private competition improves productive efficiency, especially in
the public schools (e.g. Couch, Shughart, and Williams, 1993; Hoxby, 1994, among
others). Our model, on the other hand, suggests that private alternatives may have adverse
20
effect on local governance by shielding the local elite from the public sector, especially if
Tiebout mechanism is ineffective and local elections do not reflect popular preferences so
that corrupt politicians have little to suffer either politically or financially.
Our model highlights two conditions for the success of decentralization reforms:
(i) effective oversight – in the form of hierarchical accountability mechanisms or citizen
voice – to prevent the capture of local governments by special interest groups, and (ii)
establishing institutions that spread the costs and/or benefits of governance over the
society so that everyone has a stake in the success of local governments. Those
institutions may be in the form of local revenue mobilization (e.g. use of income tax or
property tax rather than transfers from central government to finance public services) or
subsidies to the poor that help them to use “exit” mechanisms (e.g. school vouchers or
public health insurance that subsidize the use of private health-care providers if public
facilities are not accessible or fail to provide services at desired quality). The rich would
voice their discontent, only if they have a stake in good governance. This might happen if
(i) they are the users of public goods, or (ii) they (partially) finance the cost of corruption.
We also show that even then their activism would be limited, because the benefits they
receive through their political connections partially shield them from the perils of
corruption.
3.2 Theoretical Model
In this chapter, we introduce a probabilistic voting model used by Grossman and
Helpman (1994) to characterize the allocation of publicly provided services as a political
process. Local politicians seek to maximize their expected number of votes, where the
probability of a voter’s support is a function of the utility (s)he derives from the policies
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adapted, including the quality of publicly provided services and the local tax rate. One
important aspect of the model that sets itself apart from its counterparts (such as Epple
and Romano, 1996; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998) is the explicit modeling of local
capture and its implications. The local elites exert pressure on local governments so that
instead of allocating resources on publicly provided services, politicians divert resources
to certain groups. In return, politicians receive direct kickbacks or support from clientele
networks that are controlled by the local elites, which are also very common in less
developed nations.
Previous models explaining the allocation of public funds among various services
were centered around the preferences of the electorate, in particular the median voter who
casts the decisive vote. One complication with dual provision is that preferences are not
single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives (Stiglitz, 1974). The
implication of non-single-peakedness is that a voting equilibrium may not exist, and, if an
equilibrium does exist, the standard approach (invocation of the median-voter theorem)
does not generally apply to characterize that equilibrium (Epple and Romano, 1996;
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998). In contrast, in our model the objective of a politician is
transformed into maximization of (weighted) sum of voters’ welfare and the support
received from the special interest (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).  A convenient feature
of this model is that it allows a precise and simple identification of the policy choice at
equilibrium and the degree of local capture.
We do not consider voting-by-feet, either by the poor or the non-poor, in the
model, since its relevance in developing countries is questionable. We also assume that
local governments do not feel any competitive pressure from the private sector due to
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capacity constraints. Private alternatives, however, are included in the model as an exit
option available to the wealthy.
Consider an economy with two goods: money X1 and non-monetary good X2,
which can be thought as education, health services, transportation, etc., that is, the goods
that are typically provided by the private sector as well as the public sector. The non-
monetary good is provided by the government for free, but it can also be purchased from
the private market at any desired quality at a unit price of p. Let Q and G denote the
quality of non-monetary good provided by the private sector and the public sector,
respectively. The utility of a person is 1 2 1( , ) ( )U x x x u G= +  if she consumes the publicly
provided non-monetary good, and 1 ( )x pQ u Q− +  if she opts for the private market
7.
The population of the community is defined over [0,1] continuum and involves
two classes of people: the poor and the non-poor (class p and class r, respectively), where
0<θ<1 represents the proportion of the non-poor. The money the poor have only covers
the subsistence requirement and consequently, they have no access to the private market.
For simplicity we normalize their income to zero. A non-poor person, on the other hand,
has excess income y to spend on non-monetary good. The probability distribution of their
                                                
7 In some cases dual-provision of goods or services allows individuals to use both the public
system and the private system simultaneously. One can send his/her children to a public school while hiring
private tutors in off-school times; or use public hospitals for preventive care and private hospitals for
personal care.  Some individuals may also benefit from the services provided by the public sector, although
they never use them. For example, an efficient public transportation system reduces congestion and
improves transportation for users of private automobiles. For simplicity, we assume that households can
choose either the private sector or the public sector, but not both and that any positive externality, if exists,
is negligible.
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income is described by function F(y) with support ,y y   .
The non-poor opt for the private alternatives if the publicly provided good is not
of high quality, that is, ( , )G Q y p∗≤ , where { }( , ) arg max ( )
y pQ
Q y p y pQ u Q∗
≥
= − + .
Accordingly, the demand for the public good by the non-poor is a function of the quality
of the public good and the price of the good at the private market:
(1) 1 1( , ) ( ( , )) ( ( , ))D p G P y Q p G F Q p G− −= ≤ =  where 0D
G
∂ ≥
∂
 and 0D
p
∂ ≥
∂
.
The task of providing the public good to the community is delegated to a local
public office led by a politician. We equate the quality of public goods with spending-
per-capita instead of spending-per-user and assume that raising the quality by one unit
costs p dollars in the public sector, the same as the private sector. This specification rules
out the change in the quality of public goods as response to change in demand. It is more
justified when the production function involves fixed costs that dominate the per-user
cost. Later, we look at the case where quality is proportional to the spending-per-user and
discuss its implications.
The politician receives funding from the central government in the amount of T
dollars per capita which is enough to ensure that the quality of the public good can be set
at its efficient level G∗  and be available to the whole community, that is, ( )u G p∗′ =  and
T pG∗= . The local public office has no taxing authority; it has no other source of
revenue, and is required by law to balance the budget. We later discuss the implications
of local financing.
In this model corruption occurs if the politician uses (some portion of) public
funds for the benefit of specific individuals rather than providing publicly provided goods
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to the whole community. Although corruption hurts productive efficiency in the public
sector as well as allocative efficiency, we did not consider this explicitly to keep the
model simple.
A person can influence the politician only if (s)he has an established connection
with her. To establish a connection one needs a certain amount of “political capital”,
denoted by K, which can be thought as financial wealth, acquaintance with
friends/relatives in prominent positions, name recognition, personal status, social
networks and such. The political capital is assumed to be of no private use to a person,
other than establishing political connections. The cost of connection, which can be seen
as a payment to an intermediary, is denoted by λ and paid in the form of political capital.
Due to this fixed cost, political connection is feasible for only those with K λ≥ .  For the
moment, we simply assume that only the non-poor have enough capital to establish a
connection with the politician. Later, we relax this assumption.
Non-poor households with similar income levels join their forces to form lobby
groups and seek public subsidy by influencing the politician through bribe payments.
There is a vast literature on collective action and group formation starting with Olson
(1965). We, however, simply assume that the number of groups formed by the non-poor
is fixed at 1N ≥ , that each group has equal number of members, that each member within
a group shares equally the subsidy and bribe payments, and that membership is solely
based on income level. Thus, lobby j consists of 1/N of the non-poor whose income is in
the range of [yj,yj+1] with 1( ) ( ) 1/j jF y F y N+ − = , where 1y y=  and Ny y= . Let Zj and
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Bj be the total subsidy received and the bribe paid by group j, respectively8.
The strategies of the lobby groups are modeled as contingent bids: an offer of a
bribe Bj(Z) in return for a particular policy Z=(Z1,…,ZN) – the level of subsidy provided
to each group. The politician chooses a policy Z and collects the bribes promised from
each party. Her budget constraint is
(2)
1
N
j
j
T pG Z
=
= +∑
The politician weighs a number of objectives in reaching her decision, including
bribes she receives and the welfare of the community, which is described as the sum of
welfare (indirect utility) of all individuals. The indirect utility Vp of the poor is simply
u(G). The gross welfare (excluding bribe payment) of the non-poor i (in lobby j) is:
(3) { } )1( ) max ( ), ( ) ,
i j
i i j i j jy z pQ
s y z u G u Q pQ y y y +
+ ≥
= + + − ∈ Z
where zj is the amount of subsidy received by that person. His/her net welfare is
( ) ( ) ( )i i iv s b= −Z Z Z , where bi(Z) represents his/her bribe payment. Hence, the indirect
utility function of lobby j takes the form ( ) ( ) ( )j j jV S B= −Z Z Z , where
1( ) ( ) ( )j
j
y
j jy
S s dF y+= ∫Z Z  and 1( ) ( ) ( )j
j
y
j iy
B b dF y+= ∫Z Z .
The political objective function can then be written as
(4) ( ) ( )W B Vα= +Z Z
where 
1
( ) ( )
N
j
j
B B
=
= ∑Z Z  is the total bribe receipts, and 
1
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
N
j p
j
V V Vθ θ
=
= + −∑Z Z Z
                                                
8 We use capital letters for lobbies and small letters for individuals. When a symbol is in bold, it
represents the vector of symbols (over lobbies).
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is the social welfare generated by the policy. The parameter α measures the extent the
politician cares about social welfare vis-à-vis her bribe receipts.
3.3 Solution
The theoretical model we describe above is known as a common agency problem
in the literature, where several principals compete with each other to influence a single
agent to take an action that benefits them but is costly to the agent. This problem can also
be seen as a menu auction where bidders name a menu of offers for the various possible
actions available to the auctioneer and then pay the bids associated with the action
selected. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) characterized the political equilibrium for such
two-stage non-cooperative game.
PROPOSITION 1: ( )0 0,B Z  is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game if and
only if
(i) 0jB  is feasible for j = 1,,N and Z
0 is feasible for the manager.
(ii) Z0 maximizes ( ) ( )W B Vα= +Z Z .
(iii) Z0 maximizes ( )jV W+Z , the joint objective functions of the politician and
lobby j (j =1,,M ).
(iv) There exists another policy Zj for each lobby j for j =1,,N from which
the politician receives the same utility and campaign donation by that
lobby is zero.
Proof: The first condition implies that bribe cannot be negative or larger than the illicit
benefit obtained and that the amount of budget diverted to lobbies may not exceed the
available budget. The second and third conditions come from the sub-game perfectness of
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Nash equilibrium. The fourth condition states that the politician is left indifferent
between including a lobby and assuming it will not contribute at all, forming policy on
the basis of the remaining groups. The players offer to contribute just enough to ensure
the auctioneer does not switch to a policy in which they have had no influence and which
consequently might be very costly for them. In other words, if lobby j does not pay any
bribe, then the politician chooses policy Zj and receives the same utility she would get by
choosing Z0 in exchange for 0jB .
PROPOSITION 2: A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, which is truthful9, stable10 and
unique always exists.
Proof: A large number of strategies may satisfy the four conditions specified in
Proposition 1. Bernheim and Whinston (1986), however, showed that we can restrict our
attention to a class of equilibria that involve truthful strategies, since such strategies
always exist and every best response correspondence contains a truthful strategy.
Furthermore in situations where nonbinding communication is possible among players,
they are the only stable equilibria, i.e. coalition- proof. Even if some bidders have the
option to communicate with other bidders, they cannot arrange a stable and mutually
preferable joint deviation.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) showed that if bribe function is differentiable, at
least around the equilibrium policy Z0, then a locally truthful strategy implies that the
                                                
9 A strategy is truthful if a player’s announced bid for changing existing policy to another is
exactly equal to the difference between his/her gross payoffs from these policies.
10 An equilibrium is stable (or coalition-proof) if a subset of individuals cannot arrange a stable
and mutually preferable joint deviation in the absence of legally binding agreement.
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marginal change in policy matches the change in the gross welfare of lobby j:
(5) 0 0 0( ) ( )j jB S∇ =∇Z Z  for j =1,…, N
A bribe schedule is truthful if we can extend (5) for all policy alternatives.
Truthful contribution schedules induce the government to behave as if it were
maximizing a social welfare function that weights the gross-of-bribe welfare of the
interest groups at (1+α) and the welfare of unorganized households at α. Substituting (5)
into the third condition in Proposition 1 we get the optimization problem of the politician:
(6)
1
0
,..., 1
a rg max (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
N
N
j p
Z Z j
S Vα θ α θ
=
 
= + + −  ∑Z Z Z
The next proposition describes the subsidy level provided to each lobby and the
amount of bribe paid to the politician:
PROPOSITION 3: The policy 0 0 01( ,..., )NZ Z=Z  chosen by the government is
( ) 0
1
N
j j
Z Z
=
= . Moreover, at equilibrium Z0, each lobby offers the same the bribe scheme:
(7)
0
0
(0) ( )
( )j
V V
B
N
α  − 
=
Z
Z   for j=1,…,N
Proof:  Since the lobbies are identical with respect to their size, preferences, and the
political capital they possess, they would offer the same payment to the politician (i.e.
jB B=  for j=1,…,N) and receive the same amount of subsidy (i.e. jZ Z=  for j=1,…,N).
To see (7), note that the fourth condition in Proposition 1 implies that bribe offered by a
lobby at equilibrium is the one that makes the politician indifferent between choosing that
policy and the policy that would emerge if the lobby does not offer any bribe. Since the
total loss of social welfare due to budget diversion is 0(0) ( )V V− Z , that loss is shared by
each lobby equally through payments to the politician so that the politician is indifferent
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between Z0 and no-corruption equilibrium.
Next, we describe the solution of the game.
PROPOSITION 4: The policy 0 0 01( ,..., )NZ Z=Z  chosen by the government satisfies the
following conditions:
(8) 0 0 0( ) ( , , )
pu G
m p G Z
′ =
where 0 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , ) (1 )
1
m p G Z D p G Z αθ θ
α
= + −
+
 represents the portion of the public
using publicly provided goods, weighted by their relative importance as perceived by the
politician, 0 0 0 0( , , ) ( ( , , ))iD p G Z P y y p G Z
∗
= ≤  is the demand for the public goods by
the non-poor who earn less than
{ }0 0 0 0( , , ) min : arg max ( )i i
Q
y p G Z y y z pQ u Q G∗  = + − + ≥   , and z
0 is the subsidy
received by a non-poor person,
(9) 0 0T pG NZ= +
provided that the bribe function Bj(Z) for j=1,,N is at least locally differentiable
around the optimal policy Z0 and that 0 0( )jZ B≥ Z  .
Equation (8) shows that the quality of public goods at equilibrium may be lower
than its first-best level G* due to two factors: First, the welfare of the poor is not fully
incorporated into the objective function of the politician. It has a weight of 
(1 )
α
α+
 which
is less than one. Secondly, some portion of the non-poor may exit the public system and
opt for purchasing the good from the private market. This would happen if (i) the publicly
provided good is not of high quality, (ii) the price of the good at the private market is low
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so that it is affordable and/or (iii) the subsidy received by the non-poor allows them to
purchase the good from the private alternative. In that case the users of public goods do
not cover the entire population.
As long as the importance of social welfare (represented by α) is finite, some
portion of the public budget would be diverted to benefit the few, and the funding for
public goods would fall short of its-first best level. On the other hand, it is possible to
attract the non-poor to the public system by offering public goods at a quality below the
one available in the private market, i.e. G G G∗ < ≤ , where
{ }( , ) arg max ( )
y pQ
G Q y p u Q pQ∗
≥
= = − . In this case, all non-poor individuals would prefer
to use the publicly provided good. The reason they choose to stay in the public system is
the loss in purchasing power due to rejecting an entitlement from the government.
Therefore, as long as 0 ( , )G G Q y p∗≥ = , the non-poor stay in the public system despite
receiving low quality goods from the government. If, for some reason (such as inadequate
funding or mismanagement) other than corruption, the government fails to raise the
quality of public services to the level available in the private market, the non-poor may
stop using public goods and the government would be forced to lower the quality of
public goods even further, since they do not benefit the whole society.
Another implication of Proposition 4 is that the proportion of non-poor
individuals using public goods affects the amount of budget diverted, i.e. corruption. The
more they care about public goods as consumers, the more the politician has to take into
account their concerns and allocate public funds accordingly. This does not completely
eradicate corruption, but at least reduces it.
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3.4 Equilibrium with No Fixed Cost in Production Function
A legitimate question is whether the implications of the model is robust to “the
production function, i.e. the link between public spending and the quality of publicly
provided services. What happens if the fixed cost is negligible so that quality is
proportional to the per-user spending, rather than total spending?
Let’s assume that the quality of publicly provided goods takes the form TG
Mp
= ,
where T is the amount of public funds spent on publicly provided services and M
represents the portion of the community using these services, where
0 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , ) (1 )M p G Z D p G Z θ θ= + − . Then, the first-best quality level in the absence
of local capture is:
 (10) ( )( ) 1 ( )Gu G p Gη′ = +
where /( )
/G G G
dM MG
dG G
η
=
=  represents the quality elasticity of demand (of the non-poor)
for publicly provided goods at G G= . Since raising the quality of publicly provided
goods attracts households back to the public sector, the government has to consider the
extra cost of maintaining the quality level. If there were no private alternative, then
0Gη =  and consequently, ( )u G p′ = .
When local capture is considered, the decision rule changes as follows:
 (11) ( ) 0 00 0 0 0( , , )( ) 1 ( ) ( , , )G
M p G Zu G p G
m p G Z
η′ = +
where 0 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , ) (1 )
1
m p G Z D p G Z αθ θ
α
= + −
+
 represents the portion of the public
using publicly provided goods, weighted by their relative importance as perceived by the
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politician. Since the politician is more concerned about the welfare of the non-poor, the
relative importance of the poor, 
1
α
α+
, is less than one. Thus,
0 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , )M p G Z m p G Z> and the politician  allocates less resource on publicly
provided goods. Consequently, when some portion of the non-poor population chooses
the private alternative, the politician would cut publicly provided services more than what
is justified by the drop in demand. In other words, although exit of the non-poor to the
private alternative would increase per-user spending, the politician would not hold total
spending constant – in fact, the cuts would be so significant that per-user spending in
equilibrium would fall, reducing the quality of publicly provided services and hurting the
poor.
3.5 More on Financing of Public Services
Up to this point we have assumed that the cost of public services is financed
through the funds received from the central government. In this section we consider local
financing instead, but maintain the assumption that the local government has to balance
the budget.
For simplicity let’s assume a flat-rate head tax T is imposed on the community.
The budget constraint of the local government is the same as (2) except T denotes the
local tax rather than the funding received from the central government. Again for
simplicity we assume that both the non-poor and the poor pay taxes, which means that the
income of the poor covers both the subsistence requirement and the head-tax. Since in the
absence of any deadweight loss there would be no limit on the amount of transfers to the
non-poor, we assume that the tax burden of a person, denoted as c(T), is larger than
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his/her tax payment T, i.e. c(T) > T and ( ) 1c T′ ≥ . This extra tax burden can also be seen
as inefficiency inherent in government activities.
The gross welfare of a non-poor person i (in lobby j) becomes
(12) { } )1( )( ) ( ) max ( ), ( ) ,i j ii i j i i i j jy c T z pQs y c T z u G u Q pQ y y y +− + ≥ = − + + − ∈ Z
PROPOSITION 5: The policy ( )0 0,TZ  chosen by the government implies ( )0 0
1
N
j j
Z Z
=
=
and it satisfies the following conditions:
(13) 0 0 0 0( ) ( , , , )
pu G
m p G Z T
′ =
where 0 0 0 0 0 0( , , , ) ( , , , ) (1 )
1
m p G Z T D p G Z T αθ θ
α
= + −
+
 represents the portion of the
public using publicly provided goods, weighted by their relative importance as perceived
by the politician, ( )0 0 0 0 0 0( , , , ) ( , , , )iD p G Z T P y y p G Z T∗= ≤  is the demand for the
public goods by the non-poor who earn less than
{ }0 0 0 0 0( , , , ) min : arg max ( ) ( )i i
Q
y p G Z T y y z pQ c T u Q G∗  = + − − + ≥    and z
0 is the
subsidy received by a non-poor person,
(14) ( )0 1
(1 )
(1 )
c T
αθ θ
α
′ =
+ −
+
(15) 0 0 0T pG NZ= +
provided that the bribe function Bj(Z) for j=1,,N is at least locally differentiable
around the optimal Z0 , that 0T y≤ , and that 0 0( )jZ B≥ Z .
Interestingly, taxing local community, instead of using funds from the central
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government, does not change policy formulation for the public goods. The difference is
on the size of transfers to the non-poor. Previously, the politician diverted the funds net
of expenditures on public services to the special interest. Now, the size of transfers is a
separate decision variable, whose level depends on the deadweight loss of taxation. The
leakage in public funds increases the size of government, which has to be financed by
taxes imposed on the community. The increase in the tax burden causes a backlash
among the society and discourages the politician to expand transfers to the non-poor,
which, in turn, reduces the ability of those individuals to use private alternatives.
3.6 More on Political Connection
So far we have assumed that the poor have no means to influence the politician. In
this section we relax this assumption. Let Ki denote the capital possessed by individual i
of class j=p,r, where ( , )r i if K y  and ( )
p
if K represent the (joint) probability density
function of the non-poor and the poor respectively. We use Cj to denote the proportion of
group j, who have the means to contact the politician: { | }j iC K i jλ= ≥ ∈ , j=p,r. For
simplicity, we assume that the poor do not afford the private alternatives even after
receiving subsidy (if any) from the government and that only a single lobby group is
formed by the poor and by the non-poor, respectively, provided that they have access to
the politician.
PROPOSITION 6: The policy 0 0 0( , )p rZ Z=Z  chosen by the government is 
0 0 0
p rZ Z Z= =
and it satisfies the following conditions:
(16) 0 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , )
pu p G Z
m p G Z
′ =
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where
0 0 0 0
1 2( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ) (1 )
r r p pm p G Z n C n C D p G Z n C n Cα αθ θ
α α
   
= + + − + −   + +   
 is the importance of public service users in the politicians objective function,
1 ( ) ( , ) ( , )
r r rn C F K y F yλ θ∗ ∗ = −   is the proportion of the influential (i.e. endowed
with political ties) non-poor that uses public services, 2 ( ) ( , )
r rn C F yλ θ∗=  is the
proportion of the non-influential non-poor that uses public services,
0 0 0 0( , , ) ( ( , , ))iD p G Z P y y p G Z
∗
= ≤  is the demand for the public goods by the non-poor
who earn less than { }0 0 0 0( , , ) min : arg max ( )i i
Q
y p G Z y y z pQ u Q G∗  = + − + ≥   , z
0 is
the subsidy received by a non-poor person, and ( ) 1 ( )p pn C F λ = −   is the proportion of
the poor with influence over the politician,
(17) 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ( )r pr pT pG n C Z n C Zθ θ= + + −
provided that the bribe function Bm(Z) for m∈p,r is at least locally differentiable around
the optimal policy Z0.
Since n(Cp), the proportion of the poor who have access to the politician, is a
function of the entry cost λ, reducing the entry cost increases involvement in the “market
of corruption”. Although this accessibility increases the influence of special interests over
the politician, it also makes the politician be more concerned about the welfare of the
poor (at least for those who have political connection, i.e. pi C∈ ), because their welfare
affects their bids. Accordingly, the weight of these individuals increases from 
(1 )
α
α+
 to
one – the same weight as the non-poor. Other poor individuals with no access to the
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politician also benefit, because they use the same public good. Consequently, the level of
the public good at equilibrium is higher and the total amount of budget diverted is lower
when the poor have access to the politician.
 What happens if the non-poor have limited access to the politician? If those
individuals who lose their connection are not among the user of public goods, restricting
their access does not change the level of corruption (i.e. the amount of budget diverted).
The money previously distributed to those individuals would simply be shared among
other influential individuals. If they do use public goods, when they lose their influence
over the politician, the quality of public goods suffers as well, because the politician stops
paying attention to their welfare, including the quality of public goods they use.
In summary, bringing governments closer to the people would be beneficial for
the whole society. It allows the poor to organize and exert pressure on the government.
This, in turn, reduces the leakage in public funds and creates enough savings both to
reduce tax rate and to increase the provision of public goods.
3.7 More on Voice Mechanisms
Up to this point, the importance of social welfare in the politician’s objective
function has been captured by the exogenous parameter α. In this section we intend to
endogenize this parameter.
Assume that each person has two options to use the political capital (s)he
possesses. (S)he can use it to get connected with the politician and receive subsidy from
the government or (s)he can invest it in voice mechanisms, such as contacting or
petitioning of elected representatives and bureaucrats, attending official and unofficial
meetings, participating public protests, and such. We assume that establishing connection
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with the politician is probabilistic and this probability, defined as )(γq  increases with the
amount of political capital γ  that one pays to the intermediary. With probability )(γq  the
connection is set and that person receives the subsidy from the government. With
probability )(1 γq−  the connection fails. The expenditures on government services is
financed through local revenue mobilization.
We assume that only two lobby groups are formed in the community: rL, and rH.
The first group involves the non-poor who use public goods; the second group involves
the non-poor who opt for private alternatives. Each group combines the political capital
of its members and uses it to maximize the welfare of the group. The combined political
capital of each group is r
or KGDK L )(θ=  and (1 ( ))Hr o rK D G Kθ= − . Let jψ  represent
the amount of political capital devoted to voice mechanisms by group j, j=  rL, and rH,
where jjj K−= γψ . We formulate the importance of social welfare in the politician's
objective function as ( )α α= Ψ , where L Hr rψ ψΨ = + .
First, we establish the effect of the parameter α on tax rates and total spending on
publicly provided services:
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Denominators are negative due to second-order conditions. When a person uses
(part of) his/her political capital on voice mechanisms, not only the quality of public
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goods increases but also the total tax burden of the community (i.e. the size of
government) falls as well, because citizen voice reduces the amount of budget diverted to
the special interest. That decrease in transfer payments more than offsets the increase in
expenditures on public goods.
Next, we move to the equilibrium level of α. Since the poor, having no other
alternative, transfer all their political capital on voice mechanisms, we simply assume that
they do not posses any political capital. The non-poor, on the other hand, have to make a
choice between stronger political ties and better community voice. The benefit of a
stronger political connection is more (expected) subsidy from the government. The
benefit of contributing on community voice is less tax burden and better public goods.
The next two equations present the first-order conditions for each group:
(20) ( ) ( )0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )L Lr rdz dGzq q c T u G c T pd dγ θ α ψα α
 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + −  
(21) ( ) ( )
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H Hr rdz dGzq q c T c T p
d d
γ θ α ψ
α α
 
′ ′ ′ ′= − + −  
Equation (20) explains the trade-off of the non-poor who use publicly provided
goods, whereas equation (21) represents the trade-off of the non-poor who choose private
alternatives. The terms on the right hand side of both equations are the marginal benefit
of investing one unit of political capital on political connections. On the left we have the
benefit of investing on voice mechanisms. The non-poor who choose private alternatives
do not benefit from the improvement in the publicly provided services and, therefore,
their gain from more citizen voice is lower than the non-poor who use public services.
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Consequently, they invest less in citizen voice: L Hr rγ γ≥ 11.
The predictions of the model are consistent with Hirschman, (1980),  North
(1990), and Leighley (1995) who argued that people’s willingness to participate in
political initiatives and community activities varies according to their perception of how
much benefit they would receive from their effort. There is also some evidence from less
developed countries in South Asia and West Africa that indicates increased contact or
petitioning of elected representatives and (to a lesser degree) of bureaucrats, when
political decentralization is coupled with local financing and devolution of public service
provision to local governments (Crook and Manor, 1994).
3.8 The Case for School Vouchers?
One important implication of (8) and (9) is that corruption and the quality of
public services are interrelated. Corruption reduces the amount of budget allocated on
public services and consequently lowers their quality. As the non-poor abandon the
public services and turn to private alternatives, the proportion of the public with stakes on
public services drops. In response the government further reduces the funding of public
services, because the “political benefit” of providing high quality services decreases. This
creates opportunity for government to divert more funds to influential individuals while
keeping the size of government constant.
                                                
11 Depending on the levels of parameters, the attractiveness of investing in political connections
may be too strong to discourage any investment in voice mechanisms. Thus, it is possible that both Lrγ  and
Hrγ  can be zero.
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A corollary of the above argument is that if the amount of funds allocated on
public services were somehow locked at its first-best level or at least its second-best level
(i.e. the level that raises the quality of public services to a point that attracts the non-
poor), it may be possible to reduce corruption. Can vouchers be used for that purpose?
 Let’s assume that the local government is required by law to subsidize the
current users of public goods for the cost of purchasing the non-monetary good from the
private market if its quality in the public sector is below a certain level. The subsidy level
is set to ensure that one can purchase the non-monetary good at its first-best level, G*.
Everyone is not automatically eligible to receive vouchers – only a portion of those using
public services, regardless of their income level. They are chosen by a lottery, where the
probability of being selected is equal to β < 1, which is an exogenous parameter. We
consider two cases: (1) Production cost entirely consists of the fixed cost, i.e. quality is
proportional to total spending; and (2) production cost does not include any fixed cost,
i.e. the quality is proportional to the per-user spending.
In the first case, the tax revenues would be set to finance the cost of public goods
(which is pG), the cost of school vouchers (which is ( , , , )M p G Z pGβ β ∗ ), and the cost
of transfers to influential individuals (which is θ Z):
(22) ( , , , )T pG M p G Z pG Zβ β θ∗= + +
where ( , , , ) (1 ) ( , , , )M p G Z D p G Zβ θ θ β= − +  represents the proportion of public using
publicly provided goods prior to selection of voucher receivers, ( , , , )D p G Zβ  is the
proportion of the non-poor using publicly provided goods prior to selection of voucher
receivers, 0 0 0 0( , , , ) ( ( , , , ))iD p G Z P y y p G Zβ β∗= ≤  is the demand for the public goods
by the non-poor who earn less than 0 0( , , , )y p G Zβ∗  and
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quality elasticity of demand (of the non-poor) for publicly provided goods.
Comparing this result with (8), the quality of publicly provided services is
unambiguously lower. School vouchers reduce the proportion of public using public
services. As the demand goes down, so does the support for public funding.
In the second case, the cost of public goods is (1 ) ( , , , )M p G Z pGβ β− , the cost
of school vouchers is ( , , , )M p G Z pGβ β ∗ ,  and the cost of transfers to influential
individuals is θ Z:
(24) (1 ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )T M p G Z pG M p G Z pG Zβ β β β θ∗= − + +
The quality of public services at equilibrium is:
(25) ( ) 0 0 00 0 00 0 0( , , , )( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1( , , , )G G
M p G Z G Gu G p G p G
m p G Z G
βη β ηβ
∗ −
′ = + + −  
In this case, the success of the voucher program depends on the relative difference
between the quality of public services and the quality of services available in private
alternatives, and the quality elasticity of demand, 0( )G Gη . If the non-poor individuals are
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sensitive to quality of services in public schools or health facilities, the government
would be better off lowering the quality of public services even further and compensate
the non-poor (who have to pay for the private alternatives) by shifting funds from
publicly provided services to subsidies targeting the non-poor. In that case, most of the
non-poor would exit the public system. Although their departure makes public schools
and health facilities less crowded, the cuts in public funds would offset any gains and in
fact reduce per-user spending.
In both cases, the best voucher scheme is the most radical one: providing
universal coverage that offers full compensation to anyone who prefers a private
alternative over the publicly provided one. Its financial burden on public would ensure
that the publicly provided service would be as good as the one available in the private
sector. Although it is possible to reach a more refined conclusion using a more
sophisticated model, our finding highlights the need for a system that punishes local
governments instead of shifting the cost to the central government, if there is an exit to
the private alternative.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we present an analytical model that highlights a vicious cycle faced
by many developing countries, where local governments’ efforts to provide public
services to their jurisdictions are usually hampered by the influence of local elites and
widespread corruption. When publicly provided goods are not of high quality, the
wealthy can switch to private alternatives. Their exit weakens the influence of citizen
voice over politicians and reduces the popular support for the funding of publicly
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provided services. Anti-corruption initiatives to improve local governance would suffer,
since political connections of the non-poor partially shield them from the tax burden
caused by corruption. They would have even less reason to do so, if they were not users
of public goods.
Our model suggests that it is critical to create institutions that distribute the cost of
“government failure” across the whole community. Those institutions may be in the form
of local revenue mobilization (e.g. use of income tax or property tax rather than transfers
from central government to finance public services) or public subsidies to the poor that
help them to use “exit” mechanisms (e.g. school vouchers or public health insurance that
subsidize the use of private health-care providers).
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Chapter 4
Empirical Evidence
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we test the implications of our theoretical model using a unique
data set from detailed responses of public officials and households in the municipalities
and the provinces of the Philippines.
The Philippines is a particularly appropriate case for testing our hypotheses on
local capture,  citizen voice, local finance, and the dual provision of health and education
services in the context of developing countries for at least four reasons.
First, local government units in the Philippines have significant autonomy and
responsibility in provision of basic services to communities. These services include most
primary health services, disease control, operation and infrastructure of public schools
and health facilities. Primary health care, in particular, is significantly devolved in the
Philippines, with staff being hired, fired, and paid (according to a nationally-defined
scale, and mostly with central grant funds) by the local governments. Public education,
although more centralized in policy, curriculum, and personnel (almost all important
administrative issues are determined by the central government, including appointments,
promotions, salary scales), is still subject to local input, since almost nine tenth of the
central budget is allocated on personnel salaries leaving maintenance, operations, and
capital expenditures to local governments. Moreover, local governments have broad
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latitude in hiring additional teachers or supplement teacher salaries using their own
sources.
The second feature of decentralization reforms in the Philippines is that the
responsibilities of local governments are matched with local authority to raise revenue
from local sources (mostly through property taxes and business registration fees). Local
governments can set tax rates within limits set by the central government. In addition
there are entitlements from central government (called Internal Revenue Allocation)
which constitutes almost one fourth of the central government budget. These entitlements
prevent large disparities in local spending. There is a also major tax earmark for
education, the Special Education Fund, which is funded yearly by some portion of the
proceeds of real property taxes collected by all municipalities within the country. The use
of the fund is under the control of local school boards, whose members involve both
elected and appointed local officials as well as members of parent-teacher associations.
Third, the devolution of responsibilities to local governments in the Philippines is
not only administrative and fiscal, but also political. Local elections are held every three
years with the participation of 80-85 percent of electorates for more than 60,000 positions
(governor, vice governor, provincial board member, mayor, vice mayor, town council
member, and barangay captain) at the province, city, municipality, and barangay level.
In addition to institutional characteristics of the country at the local level, which
permits policy and performance variation across local government units, a necessary
condition for dual-provision of services is also satisfied, namely the presence of private
service providers. Private education plays an important role in the Philippines,
particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels. Private schools account for a substantial
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share of secondary and tertiary schools (33 percent and 79 percent, respectively) and a
modest share in elementary schools (7 percent) (World Bank, 2001).  There are more than
1,000 private hospitals in the country with more than 50,000 beds, almost as many as the
public hospitals. Almost half the population has access to private health facilities or
private doctors (World Bank, 2001).
A more detailed analysis of decentralization reforms in the Philippines and the
institutional setting of the country is available in Appendix A. In the next section, we
highlight the hypotheses we derived from our theoretical model, link each of them to the
current literature and present the empirical approach.
4.2 Hypotheses and Econometric Model
We test the implications of our theoretical model in the Philippines using 1999
Annual Poverty Indicators Survey and a unique data set, 2000 IRIS Survey, which
involves detailed responses of more than 600 public officials and 1120 households in the
selected 80 municipalities of the Philippines. A description of these survey instruments is
provided in Appendix B.
(1) Allocation of Publicly Provided Services
The key equation in our analytical model is (13), where we link the equilibrium
level of publicly provided services to local capture and redistributive politics.
(1) 0 0 0 0( ) ( , , , , , )
pu G
m p G Z Tα θ
′ =
0G
p
∂∆
<
∂
, 0G
α
∂∆
<
∂
, 0G
θ
∂∆
>
∂
, 0G
Z
∂∆
<
∂
, 0G
T
∂∆
<
∂
.
47
where  0G G G∗∆ = −  is the gap between the first-best level of publicly provided goods
and the level funded by the local government,
0 0 0 0 0 0( , , , , , ) ( , , , ) (1 )
1
m p G Z T D p G Z T αα θ θ θ
α
= + −
+
 represents the portion of the
public using publicly provided goods, weighted by their relative importance as perceived
by the politician, 0 0 0( , , , )D p G Z T  the proportion of the non-poor using publicly provided
goods when its quality is G0, its price in the private sector is p, tax level is T0 and the
amount of leakage in public funds is  Z0, θ  represents the proportion of the non-poor, and
α measures the extent to which the politician cares about social surplus vis-à-vis her
support from special interest groups.
Our model predicts that the allocation of public funds for publicly provided goods
is adversely affected by the proportion of public good users (in particular, among the
wealthy and the local elite), the heterogeneity within the community based on wealth
(also possibly other factors such as ethnicity, religion, or demographic factors, which
were not explicitly considered in the analytical model) and the amount of leakage in
public funds. The proportion of local public spending funded by local taxes and the
importance of citizen voice relative to local capture in the political system, on the other
hand, is expected to have positive influence. To the extent that private alternatives enable
the wealthy to be less dependent on publicly provided services, we also predict a negative
link between viability of private option and the level of publicly provided services. Our
model also implies that the proportion of the wealthy using a publicly provided service
would increase with its price in the private market. Hence, if some services are more
expensive than others in the private sector (tertiary education v. primary education,
curative health care v. preventive care), they are more likely to push for shifting public
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funds to these services.
Comparing the implications of the model with existing literature, the most striking
contrast is the impact of private institutions. Empirical studies on developed countries
have focused on how private competition improves productive efficiency, especially in
the public schools (e.g. Hoxby, 1994 among others). There are no comparable studies on
less developed countries. As far as the allocative efficiency is concerned, there is some
evidence that suggests the public spending in many developing countries is skewed
heavily in favor of public services (such as tertiary education and curative health care)
used by the top income quintile (World Bank, 2003; also Schwartz, Racelis, and Guilkey,
2000, and Jeppsson, 2001, on Uganda; Birn, Zimmerman, and Garfield, 2000, on
Nicaragua; Akin, Hutchinson, Strumpf, 2001, on the Philippines). This bias is even more
prevalent in countries with high income inequalities (Gradstein, 2003).  To the best of our
knowledge, however, there is no study linking the political economy of funding publicly
provided services to viability of private alternatives and their use by the wealthy. Our
model also implies that, all else being equal, the proportion of wealthy individuals using a
publicly provided service would increase with its price in the private market. These
predictions are in line with aforementioned studies.
On the other hand, at least in the context of the Philippines, there is one
mechanism that makes public school principals be responsive to the number of students
enrolled in their schools: the teacher staffing norm used by the central government to
allocate teacher positions. Teacher positions across public schools are determined by the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports and their salaries are paid from the central
government budget, although local governments may hire additional teachers if they
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choose. The staffing norm is based on student enrollments, more specifically the class
size.  A new class and consequently a new teacher is assigned for every 40 students.
When enrollments decline, classes may be merged causing schools to lose teacher
positions. Schools, however, resist losing teachers, because a principal’s rank depends on
the number of teachers in the school. This does not necessarily mean that school
enrollment is a motivating factor. Principals may exert pressure on superintendents to
allocate more teachers to their schools despite the decline in enrollments and then use
extra teachers in non-teaching positions (World Bank 1999). Still, although we predict a
negative link between private schools and public sector performance, in the context of the
Philippines, there are also reasons to expect a positive feedback through Niskanen-
mechanism (i.e. budget-maximizing bureaucrats) rather than Tiebout’s.
 Our empirical specification takes the following form:
(2) 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 1G X X X X Xβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + + Zβ Z +
where G stands for the quality or quantity of publicly provided services, X1 is political
participation (voice), X2 is the viability of exit mechanisms, which captures (indirectly)
the use of public services by the wealthy, X3 is the degree of local financing, X4 is the
influence of special interest groups over local governments, X5 is the degree of
redistributive frictions in the community, and Z is the set of control variables. The
equation is estimated at the province level.
We used both inputs and outputs as performance variables to measure G. The
publicly provided services that we focus on are health care and education. Our input
variables are (1) the number of doctors in public sector per capita, (2) the number of
nurses, midwives, trained birth attendants, and other medical personnel in public sector
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per capita, (3) teacher-student ratio in public elementary schools, and (4) teacher-student
ratio in public secondary schools. We consider the first variable as a proxy for public
spending on curative health care, whereas the second variable as a proxy for primary
health care. The data on health personnel came from the Department of Health and
regional field offices, whereas the data on education comes from the National Statistical
Coordination Board for the 1999-2000 school year. The population estimates used to
calculate health personnel per capita are based on 1995 Census-Based Population
Projections reported by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
Public sector outcomes capture the decisions on budget allocation and inputs as
well as some other unobservable factors, including efficiency of public sector, local
conditions, and such. The output variables used in our regressions are: (1) the percentage
of children (0-5 years old) immunized against hepatitis, DPT, measles/mumps/rubella and
polio, (2) the percentage of student passing National Elementary Assessment Test,
NEAT, and (3) the percentage of student passing National Secondary Assessment Test,
NSAT. Immunization data was obtained from 1999 Demographic and Health Survey,
whereas test scores at the school level are from the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports Statistical Bulletin for the 1999-2000 school year.
The choice of dependent variable used for public sector performance dictates
whether to apply a production function specification or not12. Estimation of output
variables necessitates the use of a production function, where health or education
outcomes are regressed on input variables (such as doctors per capita or teacher-student
                                                
12 A production function is a model that identifies the possible outcomes that can be achieved with
a given combination of inputs.
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ratio) along with household/community characteristics and institutions. Our theoretical
model, however, postulates that inputs are also influenced by output variable. For
example, sub par quality of education adversely affects the use of public services by the
wealthy, which in turn affects the resources allocated on education. We had two options:
using instruments for inputs or estimating a reduced form equation. Due to difficulty in
finding legitimate instruments, we chose the second option and regressed the output
variables into a set of regressors discussed below which are also the ones used to estimate
input variables. For the same reason we did not use corruption as a regressor. Since it is
an endogenous variable whose level is basically determined by the same variables that
influence the level of publicly provided goods, we again estimated a reduced form
equation.
We chose immunization as a performance measure instead of child mortality for
two reasons. First, as argued by Gauri and Khaleghian (2002), immunization is a
fundamental task of government, the cost of vaccines is quite low (less than 1$ per fully
immunized child), and financial and technical assistance is available from international
organizations. Therefore, failure to immunize the population is fundamental failure of a
government. Second, child mortality rates are influenced by a variety of household
characteristics and environmental factors (such as supply for safe drinking source,
availability of toilet facilities, sanitary garbage disposal, climate, etc.) that are beyond the
control of local government units. For education outputs we used two national tests
conducted for elementary and secondary school students. NEAT is designed to assess
abilities and skills of 6th grade pupils in elementary schools, whereas NSAT aims to
assess abilities and skills of 4th year high school students in secondary schools.
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The most conventional measure of citizen voice is voter turnout, which provides a
crude idea about the strength of citizen voice over local governments. Local voter turnout
is reported by the Commission on Elections for 1995 local elections. Ideally, we would
prefer to disaggregate voting statistics across income groups and test their significance
separately. This approach, however, is not feasible due to lack of necessary data. The
viability of exit mechanisms was captured in the form of having private service providers
(schools and health centers) in the area. Our measure for private education (health)
services is the number of private schools (health facilities) per capita. The data on the
number of private schools and the number of private health facilities came from the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports and the National Statistical Coordination
Board, respectively. The measure we used for local financing is local revenues per capita
as reported by the 1998 Annual Financial Report of Local Governments. Local
government revenues come from two sources: intergovernmental transfers (mainly in the
form of Internal Revenue Allotments) and locally generated revenues (mainly property
taxes and to lesser extent fees and taxes levied on businesses). At the aggregate level they
have nearly an equal share in the total local government income, but there exists
significant variations across local government units. We also included total local
spending per capital in the model to separate the effect of local financing from the effect
of government size.
The influence of special interest groups over politicians was captured by two
variables. Following Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) we assumed that the more unequal
the wealth distribution is, the more likely that some individuals have means to influence
local government. We created a wealth index using principal component analysis based
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on the 2000 Census of Population and Housing, which provides information on housing
characteristics and household assets. We measured the wealth inequality as the ratio of
standard deviation of wealth index within a community to average wealth index in that
community. Although one could use annual income of households for the same purpose,
it is subject to more noise than wealth, since it is a flow variable as opposed to wealth,
which is a stock variable.
As an indirect measure of influence of special interest groups over political
process we used membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or business cooperatives.
The data provided by the 1999 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey is at the household
level and allows us to match a person’s membership with his/her wealth status. Using the
wealth index we created from the 1999 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey, households
were grouped into “poor” and “non-poor”. We ranked the households in descending order
based on the wealth index. The poor involve households in the 0-33 percent, whereas the
non-poor involve households in the 33-100 percent. Although it was also possible to form
groups based on the median, we did not choose this approach and preferred to classify
“the middle class” as a part of the non-poor group, since they are likely to have access to
private alternatives as well. We calculated average membership rate for each group and
included both variables in the regressions.
Redistributive conflicts can also occur or be exacerbated along ethnic or
demographic lines as shown by Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1989), Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1997), and Poterba (1997, 1998). Therefore, we included an index of ethnic
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fractionalization and the proportion of elderly population (60 years of age or older13) to
capture these factors. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable was computed as one
minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares, and reflected the probability
that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups14.
The data for both variables were obtained from the 2000 Census of Population.
Finally, as control variables, we used the rate of urbanization15, prosperity of the
community, population density, and price level. These variables capture differences in
taste, cost of production, and potential unobservable factors. We also included the
percentage of population under 15 years of age as a proxy for demand in the
immunization equation. To determine the prosperity of a local community we used the
wealth index created from 2000 Census of Population and Housing. We do not have any
data on the cost of health or education (relative to the price of other goods in the
community). Ideally, we would prefer to have teacher or health personnel salaries to
measure price differences across communities, since both health and education services
are labor-intensive and personnel expenditure constitutes a major portion of health and
education budgets. Fortunately, in the Philippines teacher salaries are standardized
                                                
13 Studies on developed countries commonly use 65 years of age as a cut-off point. We, however,
use a lower number, due to differences in life expectancy between developed and developing countries.
14 The exact formula is 21 ii s−∑  where si is the share of group i in the jurisdiction.
15 In the Philippines, “urban” areas fall under the following categories: (1) have a population
density of at least 1,000 persons per square kilometer, (2) at least six establishments (commercial,
manufacturing, recreational and/or personal services), (3) at least three of the following: town hall, church,
public plaza, market place, or public building.
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throughout the country at a fixed rate regardless of school location, merit or experience.
Therefore, we used consumer price index at the province level to measure the price level
of non-education goods/services in 2001. The inverse of the cost price index is a proxy of
education costs. The data is obtained from the National Statistics Office of the
Philippines.
(2) Involvement in Voice Mechanisms and Community Initiatives
Equations (24) and (25) in Chapter 2 linked the parameter α to voters’
involvement in voice mechanisms and showed that the flight of the wealthy is also
harmful for the effectiveness of citizen voice over local governments:
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where ψ  represents the amount of political capital devoted to voice mechanisms, u(G) is
the utility from publicly provided services (which is zero if (s)he is not a user), q is the
probability of establishing connection with the government, Z is the benefit of from local
capture, T is the degree of local tax burden, and y is the wealth of an individual.
If a person has fled to the private alternative, (s)he would not receive any benefit
from public services and hence, (s)he would be less likely to spend any effort to make
politicians more sensitive to social welfare. Personal wealth and belonging to ethnic
majority may provide opportunities for political connections and reduce incentives to
support civic accountability. Local financing, on the other hand, is likely to increase the
interest for political participation among those that pay local taxes.
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The predictions of the model are consistent with the theoretical work by
Hirschman, (1980),  North (1990), and Leighley (1995) who argued that people’s
willingness to participate in political initiatives (such as contacting or petitioning of
elected representatives and bureaucrats, attending official and unofficial meetings, public
protests, etc.) and community activities (e.g. participation in design, construction or
operation of public projects or services, or involvement in quasi-formal organizations,
such as local councils, teacher-parent associations, etc.) varies according to their
perception of how much benefit they would receive from their effort. There is also some
evidence from less developed countries in South Asia and West Africa that indicates
increased contact or petitioning of elected representatives and (to a lesser degree) of
bureaucrats, when political decentralization is coupled with local financing and
devolution of public service provision to local governments (Crook and Manor, 1994).
We used the following econometric specification:
(5) 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 2X X Xψ β β β β ε= + + + + +W Zβ W β Z +
where X1 is a dummy variable for using publicly provided services, X2 is the household
wealth, X3 is the degree of local financing, W is the set of control variables at the
household level, including ethnic and demographic factors, and Z is the set of control
variables at the municipal level. The equation is estimated at the household level.
We used three different measures for the dependent variable, all from a unique
data set: 2000 IRIS Household Survey: The first one is the most direct measure of civic
participation: the frequency of participating in meetings with barangay officials to discuss
issues related to improvement of health provision, local roads, water delivery, etc. The
second one measures the involvement or association with PTA, mothers club, youth club,
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women club, local welfare clubs, non-governmental organizations. Finally, we also
looked at the determinants of voting in local elections.
Use of public services was captured by the same survey, which asked questions
on the use of health facilities (public, private, self) in case of illnesses experienced by any
family member and the type of schools (private, public) used for children over 5 years
old. As shown in Table 1, our sample consists of 432 poor and 686 non-poor households.
Only 7 percent of the poor have sent at least one of their children to private schools as
compared to 27 percent of the non-poor. Use of private health clinics/doctors is more
common among both groups; however, the non-poor still hold an edge with 31 percent as
compared to 9 percent by the poor. We also tried an indirect measure for this variable: the
existence of exit mechanisms– in the form of having private service providers (schools
and health centers) in the area. We expect the non-poor to have more access to private
service providers than the poor thanks to their (relatively higher) wealth.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics On The Use Public v. Private Services
Poor Non-poor
Use of Public Schools 298 (93%) 399 (73%)
Use of Private Schools 23 (7%) 150 (27%)
Use of Public Health Clinics 378 (91%) 457 (69%)
Use of Private Health Clinics / Doctors 39 (9%) 204 (31%)
N 432 686
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The wealth index was created from household characteristics and household
assets based on the questions asked in the 2000 IRIS Household Survey. The measure we
used for local financing is the ratio of local revenues to local government expenditures as
explained above. The set of municipal level control variables includes average wealth
level, average education level, consumer price index, and urbanization rate. The set of
household level control variables are education level of the parents, marital status, age,
ethnic minority dummy, home ownership, number of children, family size, and dummy
variables for occupation (wage earners, working in agriculture, rent/profit earners).
(3) Determinants of Local Capture
Our last hypothesis is on the link between local taxation and governance in local
government units. Equations (14) and (15) in Chapter 2 can be reformulated as follows:
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where Z0 is the amount of public funds diverted to the special interest groups, c′ is the
marginal tax burden of local taxes, pG0 is the amount of public funds allocated on
publicly provided services, θ  represents the proportion of the influential individuals, and
α measures the extent the politician cares about social welfare vis-à-vis her support from
the special interest groups.
The equation predicts that local financing can reduce leakage of funds by
spreading the burden of corruption through the whole community. Citizen voice and
other forms of accountability mechanisms are also expected to have a positive effect on
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local governance by raising α. Heterogeneity within society based on wealth, ethnicity,
religion, demographic factors, etc., on the other hand, is likely to increase redistributive
frictions and strengthening the power of the local elite. Viability of private sector as an
alternative in health care or education is expected to reduce popular support for publicly
provided services and divert public funds to special interest groups.
There are very limited country-specific empirical studies on the determinants of
local corruption in less developed countries. Reinikka and Svensson (2001) have linked
the leakage of funds in school budgets to the wealth of parents in PTAs. They showed
that schools with relatively wealthy parents in Uganda are more likely to afford the costs
of acquiring information and initiating protests and these schools are more successful to
prevent leakage of funds. Gray-Molina et. al. (1999) found that misuse of public funds in
municipal health service providers in Bolivia decline significantly in places where
citizens participate directly into the political process by attending health board meetings.
Finally, using a survey of public officials in Bolivia, Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Gurgur
(2004) found a positive link between existence of consumer complaint and feedback
mechanisms and public sector performance (quality, quantity, accessibility of services
and control of bribery and budget diversion). They also found that formal accountability
mechanisms have little effect on curbing corruption.
Our econometric specification takes the following form:
(6) 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 3Z X X X X X Xβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + + Zβ Z +
where X1 stands for the degree of local financing, X2 is political participation (voice), X3
is formal accountability mechanisms both at the local level and central government, X4 is
the viability of exit mechanisms, X5 is the influence of special interest groups over
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politicians, X6 is the degree of redistributive frictions in the community, and Z is the set
of control variables. The equation is estimated at the municipal level.
For the dependent variable we created indices measuring the corruption
perceptions of public officials and households separately using a set of questions asked in
respective surveys conducted by IRIS. The index for public officials is the normalized
sum of the first seven variables in Table 2. We constructed a “public official corruption
index” combining the answers of public officials working at public schools, health clinics
and municipalities. The resulting index is correlated at 0.28 (p-value=0.01) with
households’ corruption perceptions. We used this corruption index as a proxy for the
leakage of public funds.
The measures we used for local financing and exit mechanisms are the same as
above: the ratio of local revenues to local government expenditures in the first case and
the number of private service providers (schools and health centers) in the area per capita.
For political participation we used three measures: (i) the frequency of participating in
meetings with barangay officials to discuss issues related to improvement of health
provision, local roads, water delivery, etc.; (ii) involvement or association with PTA,
mothers club, youth club, women club, local welfare clubs, non-governmental
organizations; and (iii) voter turnout. The source for the first two variables is the 2000
IRIS Household Survey. Data on voter turnout, on the other hand, is from the
Commission on Elections for 1995 local elections. To measure the formal accountability
mechanisms at the local level we constructed an index based on ten questions asked in
the IRIS survey of public officials about the existence and enforcement of written targets,
inventory control, record-keeping, and frequency of personnel evaluations. We also used
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frequency of audit by central government to measure the extent of hierarchical oversight
over local governments. The influence of special interest groups was captured by wealth
inequality as we did before. We did not use membership in labor unions, trade,
agriculture or business cooperatives this time, since the data was not available at the
municipal level. For redistributive frictions in the community we only used ethnic
fragmentation, not other demographic factors (e.g. proportion of elderly in the
community) since there is no compelling theoretical argument to consider the latter. Like
many empirical studies on corruption, we also controlled for average prosperity of a
municipality (based on the wealth index), population density and urbanization level.
Table 2: Corruption Index and Its Components
Mean Statistics Mun.Health
Mun.
Adm.
Mun.
DECS
Public
School
Pub.
Health
Proportion of People Who Get Paid but Dont
Show Up
2.56 6.33 0.00 - -
Paid to Obtain Jobs 2.95 3.80 5.00 8.87 -
Bribery Happened in the last year 2.53 18.99 1.25 0.92 -
Theft of Funds Happened in the last year 16.45 31.65 1.25 1.83 -
Theft of Supplies Happened in the last year 16.23 15.38 0.00 1.83 -
Frequency of Theft of Funds 3.80 9.09 14.67 1.53 20.37
Frequency of Seeking Informal Payments 4.49 10.68 12.00 0.92 15.51
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4.3 Estimation Methods and Results
(1) Allocation of Publicly Provided Services
As discussed in Betancourt and Gleason (2000), one should expect the
disturbance terms of education and health equations to be correlated with each other due
to reasons such as trade-off in the allocation of resources or group level fixed effects that
influence decision making or operations across health and education services in a similar
pattern. Therefore, we treated the health and education equations as a system and used
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to estimate system parameters. The input variables
(number of doctors per capita, number of nurse/other medical personnel to population,
and teacher-student ratio) lie in the zero to one interval. The output variables (NEAT
scores, immunization rate of children) were also transformed into zero to one interval
after dividing by 100. This allowed a logit specification, which yields predicted values in
the same range as dependent variables. We also addressed potential unobservable effects
across regions by using a fixed-effects estimation approach. Since the F-test did not
support the existence of any fixed effects (the minimum p-value of the test statistic was
0.65), the results were not reported.
Our theoretical model predicts a reverse causality between public sector
performance and political participation. Another variable susceptible to endogeneity
problem is the viability of private alternatives in education and health care. It is possible
that private schools or health centers may choose to operate in communities where public
63
sector fails to satisfy local demand in quality or quantity or both16. Therefore, we also use
an instrumental variable approach to prevent potential bias that arises from such reverse
causality. Logit specification leads to a non-linear estimation that enables us to use
polynomials of exogenous variables as instruments in the first stage. Our choice of
instruments are the squares of wealth, ethnic fractionalization, percent of population over
60 years of age, population density, and percent of population in urban area.
There is a growing literature on detecting weak instruments, surveyed in Stock,
Wright, and Yogo (2002). As long as the instruments are strongly correlated with the
explanatory variable, standard asymptotic theory can be employed to develop reliable
inference methods. However, these econometric methods may fail if the instruments are
weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables. In particular, the IV
estimates are strongly biased in the same direction as OLS estimates in finite samples and
may lead to incorrect inference (Maddala and Jeong, 1992). The paper by Bound, Jaeger,
and Baker (1995) is an important reference point for applied researchers who use
potentially weak instruments. Their striking result that confidence regions for returns-to-
schooling using randomly generated instruments are similar to those found by Angrist
and Krueger (1991) has prompted applied researchers to address the issue of weak
instruments.
Various procedures are available for detecting weak instruments in the linear IV
model:
                                                
16 In fact, Jimenez and Sawada (2001) examined the relationship between public and private
school enrollment in the Philippines and found that the large expansion in the public secondary education
sector in the last decade is negatively associated with private secondary enrollment.
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1. The first-stage F-statistic: Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock
(1997) argue that, for the case of a single endogenous regressor, one could rely on
the usual procedures with a first-stage F-statistic larger than 10. While the first-
stage F-statistic is useful for suggesting when the IV approach performs poorly, it
does not distinguish between the many instrument and the weak instrument
problems. If there are many instruments the F-statistic can be arbitrarily small.
2. The first stage R2:  Shea (1997) considered multiple included regressors and
suggested looking at a partial R2. As a rule of thumb, the first stage R2 should be
greater than 30%.
3. Cragg-Donald statistic: Stock and Yogo (2002) use the Cragg-Donald (1993)
statistic to test whether given instruments are weak. The proposed test for weak
instruments is based on the eigenvalue of the matrix analog of the F-statistic from
the first stage regression:
1/ 2 1 1 1/ 2
2
ˆ ˆ / K− − − −′= ZG Σ Y P Y Σ  where Z is the set of instruments, Y is the set
of endogenous variables, K1 is the number of endogenous variables,  K2 is
the number of exogenous variables, T is the number of observations,
2
1 2/( )T K K′= − −ZΣ Y M Y , ′ ′=ZM I - Z(Z Z)Z , Z = [X,Z] , and X is the
set of exogenous variables included in the second stage. The test statistic
is the minimum eigenvalue of G. The critical values are reported in Stock
and Yogo (2002).
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We verified the validity of overidentifying restrictions using Hausman test17 and
addressed the weak instruments problem by reporting first-stage F-statistics, first-stage
partial R2, concentration parameter, and Cragg-Donald statistic. The test results, overall,
did not indicate “weak instruments” problem.
The first-stage results on private health facilities, private primary schools and
private secondary schools are reported in Table 3. The findings are mostly consistent with
Jimenez and Sawada (2001), where the enrollment in public secondary schools were
found to be negatively correlated with public school enrollment and positively correlated
with population and income per capita. We found also that average wealth per province,
population density, percent of population under 15 years of age and percent of population
in urban area have positive effect on the supply of private schools and private health
facilities. Interestingly, the supply of primary schools is more elastic to wealth than the
supply of secondary schools. This may be due to large variation in the quality of private
school at the secondary level, which makes private alternatives somewhat available in
less wealthy areas as well as more affluent regions. We also found that wealth inequality
                                                
17 The test is based on regressing the residuals from the main structural equation on the entire set
of exogenous variables. Under the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions, the test statistic, NR2 (N
is the sample size and R2 is the uncentered the goodness of fit from the regression of residuals on all the
instruments) has a χ2 distribution with K-T degrees of freedom, where K is the number of exogenous
variables and T is the number of endogenous variables. If the instruments are excluded from the structural
equation correctly, the set of instruments should have no explaining power over the residuals and
consequently R2 should be low. The p-value of the test statistic ranges between 0.76 and 0.92 depending on
which input or output variable is tested. Hence, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the
overidenfying restrictions are valid.
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has an adverse effect on the supply of private primary schools, but not private secondary
schools. This again may be caused by quality differences across private secondary
schools. Another interesting finding is that although local financing does not have any
significant effect on private supply, the size of local government expenditures do: Private
alternatives are less likely to be available in provinces where local spending per capital is
higher. This finding suggests that private schools and health centers emerge as a response
to the failure of government to satisfy the public demand for education and health.
67
Table 3: First-Stage Results on Private Health Centers, Private Primary Schools and
Private Secondary Schools
Prv. Health
Centers
Prv. Primary
Schools
Prv. Secondary
Schools
Local government revenues per capita (log) 0.1732(1.22)
0.1678
(1.36)
0.0982
(1.56)
Local government expenditures per capita
(log)
-0.2933
(-2.15)**
-0.2912
(-2.08)**
-0.2243
(-1.71)*
Wealth inequality -0.1343(-1.33)
-0.4081
(-2.19)**
-0.1474
(-1.63)
Membership in labor unions, trade,
agriculture or business coop by the non-poor
0.1290
(1.38)
0.0790
(1.02)
0.0988
(1.18)
Membership in labor unions, trade,
agriculture or business coop by the poor
-0.0220
(-0.11)
0.0773
(0.60)
0.0675
(0.98)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.1033(1.20)
0.1933
(1.77)*
0.1766
(1.90)*
Percent of population under 15 years of age 0.4641(2.49)**
0.5953
(2.15)**
Percent of population over 60 years of age 0.0905(0.69)
0.1164
(0.17)
0.0050
(0.10)
Consumer price index 0.0160(0.04)
0.0553
(0.61)
0.0576
(0.98)
Population density 0.5276(2.15)**
0.6820
(2.48)**
0.2172
(1.89)*
Average wealth of the province 0.5527(3.31)***
1.0432
(3.10)***
0.3975
(2.28)**
Percent of population in urban area 0.4386(3.08)***
0.3506
(2.05)**
0.2784
(2.13)*
N 114 114 114
F-test on significance of the model 5.36 2.86 3.33
Wald test on significance of the model p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
Pseudo R square 0.82 0.65 0.71
1 Elasticities around the mean are reported.
2 t-statistics in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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We begin with input variables. The regression results on public health inputs and
public education inputs are reported in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. The coefficient
in the voter turnout is positive but not significant in all four models, regardless of whether
the estimations are from SUR or instrumental variable approach. It is possible that voting
alone is not an effective mechanism to discipline politicians in the Philippines18.
We find a strong direct link between health inputs and local financing. A 10
percent increase in the local revenues per capita (keeping total government expenditures
constant) raises the number of doctors by 2 percent and the number of other medical
personnel by 2.5 percent. If the increase in local financing is matched with an increase in
total spending, then the rise in the number of medical personnel would be as much as 6
percent. We do not find a similar impact on education inputs. That can be attributed to
more extensive devolution of health service to local government units as compared to
education where teacher allocation is mostly controlled by the central government.
We also look at the interaction of voter turnout and local financing, which is
positive and significant when the dependent variable is the number of nurses, midwives,
etc. or the teacher-student ratio in primary schools. Since the closest public health
facilities in many areas are mainly barangay health stations and rural/urban health units,
which are staffed by nurses and midwives (World Bank, 2001), this result can be seen as
an indication that political and local financing working together gives local governments
flexibility to prioritize health spending based on local needs and preferences.
                                                
18 Another possibility is that voter turnout is not a good measure for citizen voice. Ideally, we
would prefer to disaggregate voting statistics across income groups and test their significance separately.
This approach, however, is not feasible due to lack of necessary data.
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Table 4: Province Level Regression Results on Public Health Inputs
SUR IV SUR IV
Doctors per capita Nurses, midwives, andother per capita
Voter turnout 0.1204(1.60)
0.0953
(1.34)
0.1190
(1.41)
0.0763
(0.98)
Local government revenues per capita (log) 0.1922(1.93)*
0.2204
(2.17)**
0.2492
(2.21)**
0.2684
(2.36)**
Local government expenditures per capita (log) 0.4105(2.77)***
0.3564
(2.52)**
0.3002
(2.50)**
0.2892
(2.16)**
Voter turnout * Ratio of local revenues to local
government expenditures
0.0049
(0.06)
-0.0118
(-0.13)
0.3574
(2.33)**
0.3784
(2.47)**
Wealth inequality -1.020(-2.71)***
-0.7114
(-2.43)**
-0.9274
(-2.02)**
-0.8385
(-1.97)**
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or
business cooperatives by the non-poor
0.6922
(2.40)**
0.7092
(2.56)**
-0.4392
(-2.52)**
-0.4001
(-2.23)**
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or
business cooperatives by the poor
0.0322
(0.57)
0.0781
(0.81)
-0.0290
(-0.19)
-0.0673
(-0.71)
Number of private health centers per capita -0.1655(-1.89)*
-0.1982
(-2.02)**
-0.0711
(-1.42)
-0.15873(-
1.92)*
Number of private health centers per capita *
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or
business cooperatives by the non-poor
0.0890
(0.77)
0.0651
(0.69)
-0.0441
(-0.27)
-0.0527
(-0.42)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.2881(-2.40)**
-0.3309
(-2.57)**
-0.1912
(-1.78)*
-0.1013
(-0.78)
Percent of population over 60 years of age -0.0823(-0.88)
-0.0717
(-0.62)
0.0301
(0.73)
0.0022
(0.09)
Consumer price index -0.0024(-0.01)
0.0092
(0.13)
0.0762
(0.54)
0.0444
(0.40)
Population density 0.5119(2.10)**
0.6573
(2.39)**
0.2287
(1.92)*
0.4082
(2.11)**
Average wealth of the province 0.5493(2.35)**
0.4478
(2.01)**
0.8300
(2.65)**
0.9012
(2.99)***
Percent of population in urban area 0.4343(2.09)**
0.4705
(2.33)**
0.5432
(2.57)**
0.6012
(2.49)**
N 114 114 114 114
Wald test on significance of the model p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
Pseudo R square 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.34
1 The input equations are estimated as a system by SUR and IV. Robust estimates of the variance
covariance matrix is used due to potential heteroscedasticity across provinces.
2 Elasticities around the mean are reported.
3 t-statistics in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
4 Instruments for voter turnout, private alternatives and interactions terms are the squares of wealth, ethnic
fractionalization, percent of population over 60 years of age, population density, and percent of
population in urban area.
5 First-stage F-statistic = 3.70 (voter turnout), 5.36 (private health centers), 4.34 (interaction term)
6 First-stage R2= 0.73 (voter turnout), 0.82 (private health centers), 0.77 (interaction term)
7 Cragg-Donald statistics: 3.12 (cutoff point: 6.59)
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Table 5: Province Level Regression Results on Public Education Inputs
SUR IV SUR IV
Teacher-student
ratio in public
primary schools
Teacher-student
ratio in public
secondary schools
Voter turnout 0.0965(1.16)
0.1364
(1.59)
0.0184
(0.16)
0.0271
(0.64)
Local government revenues per capita (log) 0.0877(0.99)
0.1231
(1.48)
0.1773
(1.79)*
0.1891
(1.90)*
Local government expenditures per capita (log) 0.1509(1.88)*
0.1229
(1.63)
0.1982
(2.03)**
0.2110
(2.14)**
Voter turnout * Ratio of local revenues to local
government expenditures
0.3271
(2.33)**
0.2891
(2.12)**
0.1687
(1.82)*
0.1263
(1.32)
Wealth inequality -0.7400(-2.28)**
-0.6662
(-2.11)**
-0.4702
(-2.39)**
-0.5382
(-2.53)**
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or business
cooperatives by the non-poor
0.6392
(2.16)**
0.5220
(1.91)*
0.2274
(1.78)*
0.1892
(1.55)
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or business
cooperatives by the poor
-0.0160
(-0.41)
0.0552
(0.60)
0.0675
(0.98)
0.0196
(0.47)
Number of private elementary (secondary) schools per
capita
0.0890
(0.77)
0.0651
(0.69)
-0.0441
(-0.27)
-0.0527
(-0.42)
Number of private elementary (secondary) schools per
capita * Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or
business cooperatives by the non-poor
-0.1710
(-1.33)
-0.4299
(-2.00)**
-0.3109
(-2.13)**
-0.2441
(-1.92)*
Ethnic fractionalization 0.1044(0.69)
0.0371
(0.39)
0.0050
(0.10)
0.0192
(0.41)
Percent of population over 60 years of age 0.0551(0.40)
0.0642
(0.53)
-0.0043
(-0.09)
-0.0122
(-0.14)
Percent of population under 15 years of age -0.0023(-0.01)
0.0087
(0.12)
0.0755
(0.53)
0.0440
(0.39)
Consumer price index 0.1377(1.25)
0.1476
(1.56)
0.2483
(2.33)**
0.1983
(2.05)**
Population density 1.3216(3.27)***
1.1640
(3.50)***
0.4491
(2.00)**
0.2734
(1.69)*
Average wealth of the province 0.5900(3.60)***
0.5206
(4.01)***
0.3551
(2.93)***
0.4010
(3.07)***
Percent of population in urban area 0.4343(2.09)**
0.4705
(2.33)**
0.5432
(2.57)**
0.6012
(2.49)**
N 114 114 114 114
Wald test on significance of the model p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
Pseudo R square 0.29 0.33 0.39 0.32
1 The input equations are estimated as a system by SUR and IV. Robust estimates of the variance
covariance matrix is used due to potential heteroscedasticity across provinces.
2 Elasticities around the mean are reported.
3 t-statistics in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
4 Instruments for voter turnout, private alternatives and interactions terms are the squares of wealth, ethnic
fractionalization, percent of population over 60 years of age, population density, and percent of
population in urban area.
5 First-stage F-statistic = 3.70 (voter turnout), 2.86 (private schools), 3.13 (interaction term)
6 First-stage R2= 0.73 (voter turnout), 0.65 (private health centers), 0.68 (interaction term)
7 Cragg-Donald statistics: 2.24 (cutoff point: 6.59)
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The variables we used to capture the influence of special interest groups, wealth
inequality and membership in professional organizations by the non-poor, are found to be
significant in both health and education inputs with various degrees. The adverse effect of
wealth inequality is clearer in the public health sector as compared to public education
system. Holding other variables at their average levels, a 10 percent increase in wealth
inequality causes a more than 10 percent decrease in the number of health personnel and
5-7 percent decrease in the number of teachers at public schools.
The second variable that measures the influence of special interest groups is
membership in professional organizations. We estimate the coefficient in this variable for
the poor and the non-poor separately, where each group is defined based on the wealth
index we have constructed before. We do not find any significant link between input
variables and membership in professional organizations by the poor. Membership by the
non-poor, on the other hand, is significant in three cases: teacher-student ratio in public
primary schools, the number of doctors per capita and the number of nurses, midwives
and other personnel per capita. Provinces that report higher membership figures for the
non-poor are more likely to have more teachers at the primary level and more doctors in
public payroll, but at the same time less nurses, midwives and other medical personnel in
public health facilities.
These results on public education inputs are in contrast with some empirical
evidence cited in the literature that suggests skewness of resource allocation towards
tertiary education19. The reason we observe this influence over public primary schools
rather than public secondary schools may be the viability of private alternatives at the
                                                
19 See page 6.
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secondary level20. In other words, most parents may use their political influence to shift
funding from secondary education to primary education (either by lobbying the
Department of Education for more teaching positions or pressuring local governments to
hire additional teachers) due to lack of alternatives in the private sector for the latter. The
significant and negative coefficient in the interaction term (membership of the non-poor
in professional organizations times the number of private schools) supports this
argument. Presence of private schools alone does not seem to have any effect on public
education inputs. The results do not change when potential endogeneity is addressed with
an instrumental variable approach. An adverse effect becomes visible only when having
private alternatives in community is coupled with influence of special interest groups21.
In the public health sector, on the other hand, provinces that have higher
membership in professional organizations seem to have a preference for more doctors and
less nurses, midwives, and other medical personnel. To the extent that public spending
for doctors is a proxy for public spending on curative health care, this result is consistent
with the view that health care spending on developing countries is biased towards public
services mostly used by the top income quintile. Although there exist private alternatives
in curative health care, many influential households may prefer to use public hospitals for
such services due to cost considerations and, therefore, pressure local governments to hire
more doctors rather than nurses or midwives, which are primarily used by low income
                                                
20 Private schools account for 33 percent share of secondary and 7 percent share in elementary
schools (World Bank, 2001).
21 We should note that this finding does not contradict Jimenez (2001) who found a negative link
between enrollment rates of public and private schools, because he did not look at the teacher-student ratio.
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groups. The interaction term (membership of the non-poor in professional organizations
times the number of private health facilities) is insignificant, but the number of private
health facilities enters with a negative and significant coefficient in both public health
inputs. This may arise from crowding-out effect. Unlike public education, where the
Department of Education decides the minimum number of teaching positions in public
schools local governments usually enjoy more discretionary authority in public health.
Hence, local governments may choose to reduce the number of medical personnel in
public health facilities to save from personnel expenditures.
There is little evidence that shows the presence of redistributive conflicts along
demographic lines. Neither the proportion of elderly population nor the proportion of
school-age children population appears to have any effect in health or education inputs.
Ethnic fractionalization, on the other hand, is significant with a negative coefficient on
health inputs, but not education inputs. The price index of consumer goods has no effect
on the number of health personnel. Surprisingly, it positively affects the teacher-student
ratio. We attribute this result to generous salary scheme of teachers which is set
uniformly across provinces by the central government. In provinces where the price level
of other goods and services is above the national average, the real cost of hiring
additional teachers would be lower. The positive coefficient in the population density in
some health and education inputs can also be contributed to presence of fixed cost in
production functions and consequently, the economies of scale in densely populated
areas. Finally, we find that both the urbanization of a province and the prosperity level
have very large and significant effect on health and education inputs. This suggests that
decentralization experience of the Philippines has so far been unsuccessful in allocating
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publicly provided services to rural areas and removing input inequity across provinces
that stems from differences in wealth distribution.
In Table 6, we use the same empirical specification to estimate output equations.
The goodness of fit is generally lower (in particular in immunization rate) as compared to
the regressions that use input variables as dependent variables. There may be other
factors affecting the variation in quality of education and health outcomes possibly
beyond the control of local governments. There is little evidence that student test scores
and immunization rates do respond to higher spending or the way government
expenditures are financed. However, one should be careful in the interpretation of these
results, our variable captures total government expenditures, not education expenditures.
Ethnic fractionalization, wealth inequality, prosperity of the province and urbanization
rate seem to be the most critical factors in both education and health outcomes. The first
two variables have significant adverse effects on both immunization rates and test scores.
Average prosperity and urbanization, on the other hand, have positive and statistically
significant coefficients. Percent of population under 15 years of age, a proxy for demand,
is another significant variable with a negative coefficient in the immunization equation.
Local governments in the Philippines seem to have difficulty in coping with demand due
to capacity problems. Membership in professional organizations, voter turnout, and local
financing, on the other hand, are insignificant in all three equations.
The most interesting finding is the effect of private secondary schools on average
NSAT scores. Unlike immunization rate and average NEAT scored, where the presence
of private service providers have no effect, when it comes to secondary education the
coefficient in the private schools become significant and positive – the more private
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schools exist in the area, the better the scores are in public secondary schools. Note that
when we used input variables on the left hand side, the effect of private health facilities
and to some extent private schools were negative. Why does the “exit” option have a
positive impact on secondary education? We explain this result with two factors: First,
private schools have a wider coverage at the secondary level. Unlike private elementary
schools which are quite limited in most of the country, private secondary schools account
for more than one third of secondary students of which one fourth are from poor families.
Second, as discussed in the introduction, the promotion of school principals is linked
indirectly to enrollment rate. Higher enrollment rate necessitates allocation of more
teachers to the school, which, in turn, allows the promotion of school principal, whose
rank depends on the number of teachers. Facing competition with private schools, public
school principals needs to boost education quality to retain existing students and attract
more students.
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Table 6: Province Level Regression Results on Public Education Outputs and Public Health Outputs
Average scores of
public schools in
National Elementary
Assessment Test
Average scores of
public schools in
National Secondary
Assessment Test
Immunization rate of
infants
SUR IV SUR IV SUR IV
Voter turnout -0.0438(-0.72)
-0.0420
(-0.96)
0.0013
(0.05)
0.0052
(0.11)
0.0289
(0.11)
-0.0242
(-0.24)
Local government revenues per capita (log) 0.0205(0.50)
0.0240
(0.63)
0.0812
(0.77)
0.0778
(0.81)
0.1083
(1.12)
0.1012
(1.02)
Local government expenditures per capita (log) 0.0992(0.98)
0.1082
(1.03)
0.1673
(1.92)*
0.2152
(2.18)**
0.0582
(0.38)
0.0703
(0.43)
Voter turnout * Ratio of local revenues to local government expenditures 0.1814(1.53)
0.1515
(1.23)
0.0961
(0.76)
0.1002
(0.85)
-0.0033
(-0.12)
-0.0061
(-0.33)
Wealth inequality -0.8902(-2.70)***
-0.8739
(-2.49)**
-0.7604
(-2.01)**
-0.7489
(-2.10)**
-0.5489
(-2.23)***
-0.4284
(-1.98)**
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or business cooperatives by
the non-poor
0.1198
(1.11)
0.1460
(1.09)
0.0919
(0.76)
0.1255
(1.34)
0.2189
(1.89)*
0.2042
(1.71)*
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or business cooperatives by
the poor
0.0101
(0.56)
0.0109
(0.61)
-0.0194
(-0.06)
-0.0221
(-0.13)
0.0203
(0.22)
0.0299
(0.41)
Number of private elementary schools per capita 0.1782(1.58)
0.1408
(1.37)
No. of private elementary schools per capita * Membership in labor unions,
trade, agriculture or business cooperatives by the non-poor
0.0166
(0.28)
0.0199
(0.42)
Number of private secondary schools per capita 0.4148(2.48)**
0.3841
(2.13)**
No. of private secondary schools per capita * Membership in labor unions,
trade, agriculture or business cooperatives by the non-poor
-0.0651
(-0.41)
-0.0778
(-0.45)
Number of private health facilities per capita 0.0930(0.88)
0.1104
(1.08)
No. of private health facilities per capita * Membership in labor unions, trade,
agriculture or business cooperatives by the non-poor
-0.0078
(-0.06)
-0.0111
(-0.14)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.3912(-2.41)**
-0.4031
(-2.33)**
-0.2056
(-1.97)**
-0.2189
(-2.08)**
-0.1416
(-1.33)
-0.1730
(-1.73)*
77
Percent of population under 15 years of age 0.2989(1.81)*
0.2631
(1.54)
0.1110
(1.41)
0.1323
(1.06)
-0.2644
(-1.89)*
-0.3204
(-1.99)**
Percent of population over 60 years of age -0.1031(-0.62)
-0.0677
(-0.39)
0.0356
(0.26)
0.0224
(0.24)
-0.0611
(-0.78)
-0.0629
(-0.83)
Population density 0.3786(2.17)**
0.3482
(2.08)**
0.1285
(1.09)
0.1379
(1.41)
0.0979
(1.33)
0.0892
(1.47)
Consumer price index 0.1092(1.03)
0.1333
(1.32)
0.1491
(1.76)*
0.1271
(1.69)*
0.0973
(0.87)
0.1001
(0.99)
Average wealth of the province 0.9109(3.25)***
1.1642
(3.50)***
2.4917
(4.13)***
2.7344
(4.56)***
2.0892
(3.47)***
2.0091
(3.38)***
Percent of population in urban area 0.6099(3.61)***
0.6206
(4.01)***
0.8355
(2.63)**
0.7401
(2.47)**
0.0872
(0.99)
0.1522
(1.22)
N 114 114 114 114 114 114
Wald test on significance of the model p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
Pseudo R square 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.17
1 The output equations are estimated as a system by SUR and IV. Robust estimates of the variance covariance matrix is used due to potential heteroscedasticity
across provinces.
2 Elasticities around the mean are reported.
3 t-statistics in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
4 Instruments for voter turnout, private alternatives and interaction terms are the squares of wealth, ethnic fractionalization, percent of population over 60 years of
age, percent of population under 15 years of age, population density, and percent of population in urban area.
5 First-stage F-statistic: see Table 4 footnote 5 and Table 5 footnote 5
6 First-stage R2: see Table 4 footnote 6 and Table 5 footnote 6
7 Cragg-Donald statistics: 3.35 (cutoff point: 6.59)
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(2) Involvement in Voice Mechanisms and Community Initiatives
The empirical results in the previous section showed that citizen voice may
motivate local politicians to invest on publicly provided services, if local governments
have financial and administrative flexibility to respond to voter preferences. In this
section we quantify the determinants of a person’s involvement in voice mechanisms and
other initiatives for the common good.
Since the individual units of analyses (households) in our sample are nested
within higher-level units of analysis, it is possible that unobservable effects in each cross-
section may cause biased estimates. Therefore, we estimated the equations using a
random effect probit model where observations are grouped by provinces. We also
included corruption in municipal governments as a control variable in the model, since
households may be less likely to participate in local politics, if they believe that their
voice cannot be heard in a corrupt government. In the next section we will address
reverse causality between citizen voice and local corruption. We did not take into account
endogeneity of the corruption variable below, since our regressions are at the household
level and it is unlikely that the decision of each individual would have a significant effect
on a municipal level variable.
In Table 7 we reported the determinants of three voice variables: (1) participating
in meetings with barangay officials; (2) involvement or association with community
initiatives, such as PTA, mothers club, youth club, women club, local welfare clubs, non-
governmental organizations; and (3) voting in local elections. Each equation was
estimated separately for the poor and the non-poor.
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We start with the sample of poor households. Although the coefficient of using
public services is positive in all three equations, it is not significant. This may be due to
the fact that there is little variation in the regressor, i.e. most poor households use public
services. Local financing has a positive but marginal impact on poor households’
participating in barangay meetings. There is some evidence pointing out the adverse
effect of corruption on voice variables. It seems to discourage both voter turnout by the
poor and their participation in barangay meetings, but interestingly it has a positive effect
on a person’s involvement in community activities. One explanation may be that local
communities, facing corruption and mismanagement in public offices, step up and try to
fill the void. Both the wealth index and education level, on the other hand, turn out to be
significant with a positive sign, whereas the ethnic minority dummy is significant and
negative, suggesting that poorer, less educated households and those in ethnic minority
are more likely to be alienated from the political process. Interestingly, households in
rural areas are more politically active than those in urban areas. This may be an indication
of stronger community ties among rural households. We did not find any evidence for the
influence of a person’s occupation on his/her decision to involve in voice mechanisms.
Age and home ownership are also insignificant, in general, but younger households seem
to vote less likely in local elections and home-owners are more likely to participate in
barangay meetings.
Turning to the regression results for the non-poor we find that using public
services is strongly linked with participating in meetings with barangay officials. The
more the wealthy use public health facilities or public schools, the more likely they are
participate in meetings with public officials to discuss issues related to public services,
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improvement of health provision, local roads, water delivery, etc. Home ownership also
has a similar effect. Our prediction about a positive link between local financing and
political activism is also partially confirmed by the regression results. The coefficient in
the local financing variable is positive and significant when the dependent variable is
participation in barangay meetings and it has positive sign in other two equations. Unlike
the regressions on poor households, we do not find any evidence that corruption in local
governments influence decisions of non-poor households. The coefficient in that variable
stays insignificant. Among household characteristics, the wealth index has a significant
and positive coefficient in all three equations, but its square is negative when the
dependent variable is involvement in community activities and participating in barangay
meetings. This suggests that political participation is supported by individuals’ resources,
but after some point more financial resource reduces that interest. Unlike the sample of
poor individuals, we do not find any negative effect of being in ethnic minority.
Overall, the regression results support our prediction that using publicly provided
services motivates wealthy individuals to be more active in the community in terms of
participating in meetings with barangay officials. We did not find a similar link for poor
households, but this may be due to lack of a variation in the regressor. In both samples
we found some evidence that shows local financing as a determinant of a person’s
involvement in voice mechanisms. Corruption in local governments seems to have some
adverse effect on poor households’ participation in barangay meetings and their voting in
local elections, but it does not influence the non-poor households.
81
Table 7: Household Level Regression Results on Civic Participation and Voice
Dependent variables are:
(1) Participation in barangay meetings (IRIS 2000)
(2) Involvement in PTA, mothers club, youth club, women club, local welfare clubs, and other community-based organizations (IRIS 2000)
(3) Voting in local elections (IRIS 2000)
Poor Poor Poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Use of public schools and public health facilities 0.0502(0.72)
0.0821
(1.30)
0.0178
(0.24)
0.2684
(2.91)***
0.1424
(1.44)
0.0718
(1.06)
Wealth index of the household 0.2292(2.40)**
0.1718
(2.33)**
0.1402
(1.94)*
0.1901
(1.94)*
0.3978
(2.94)***
0.2422
(2.08)**
Wealth index square of the household -0.0253(-0.75)
-0.0422
(-1.56)
0.0899
(1.73)*
-0.1782
(-2.43)**
-0.047
(-2.32)**
0.0681
(0.89)
Ratio of local revenues to local government expenditures 0.1338(1.85)*
0.0470
(0.44)
0.0889
(1.60)
0.2654
(2.26)**
0.0932
(1.53)
0.0593
(0.41)
Corruption in municipal government -0.3932(-2.25)**
0.1630
(2.45)**
-0.1274
(-1.82)*
0.0432
(0.81)
0.0133
(0.50)
0.0563
(0.89)
Education level of household (high school or higher) 0.2003(2.41)**
0.1929
(2.03)**
0.2112
(2.47)**
0.1027
(2.22)**
0.0904
(1.73)*
0.2261
(2.51)**
Household at urban area -0.3566(-2.89)***
-0.2622
(-2.25)**
0.0992
(1.16)
-0.1393
(-1.89)*
0.0890
(0.91)
0.1477
(2.35)**
Ethnic minority -0.1890(-2.03)**
-0.3693
(-3.44)***
-0.1043
(-1.81)*
-0.0412
(-0.75)
0.0038
(0.12)
-0.0353
(-0.71)
Age (log) -0.1120(-1.44)
-0.0733
(-1.05)
0.1470
(1.77)*
0.1002
(1.94)*
0.1763
(2.33)**
0.1441
(1.99)**
Home ownership 0.1204(1.80)*
0.1692
(1.99)**
-0.0291
(-0.39)
0.1991
(2.05)**
0.0929
(1.03)
0.0022
(0.05)
Wage earner 0.0423(0.91)
0.0579
(1.02)
0.1008
(1.82)*
0.0352
(0.57)
0.0664
(0.98)
-0.0981
(-1.41)
Working in agriculture 0.1100(1.35)
0.0991
(0.92)
0.0477
(0.78)
0.1992
(2.40)**
0.0009
(0.03)
0.0393
(0.25)
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Rent/profit earner -0.0531(-1.05)
-0.0033
(-0.05)
0.0099
(0.13)
0.0412
(0.65)
0.0302
(0.31)
-0.0912
(-1.09)
N 429 429 429 623 623 623
Pseudo Rsq. 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.14
Wald-test on the model p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
Wald-test on random effects p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
1 Observations are grouped by provinces. The model is estimated using random effect probit.
2 Elasticities around the mean are reported.
3 t-statistics in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
4 The model also includes the following variables: average municipal wealth, average municipal education level, and consumer price index. The set of household
level control variables are: marital status, number of children, and family size.
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(3) Determinants of Local Capture
We estimated the equation on corruption using a logit specification since
corruption index is between zero and one. We also considered an ordered probit
specification (where corruption variable is divided into 5 equal units) due to the fact that
the dependent variable is a subjective measure of corruption, which makes it sensitive to
measurement error. Finally, to address potential reverse casualty problems inherent in
some regressors, in particular voice variables, we tried an instrumental variable approach.
The influence of corruption on voice variables was predicted by our model and the
empirical results at the household level above suggested that this influence might be
significant. We used three questions from the 2000 IRIS Household Survey as
instruments for participating in voice mechanisms. These are the extent to which
households follow local events and politics, whether the households receive their
information from local officials instead of news organizations or their friends and
neighbors, and whether households know who their vice-mayor is. We assume that the
households, who show interest in activities of their local governments and spend time to
get informed about local events (through unbiased sources), are more likely to voice their
support or contempt of local politicians.
The results are presented in Table 8. It is clear that prosperity of a municipality is
the most important factor determining the level of corruption in local governments.
Wealth inequality, a proxy for the strength of local elite in a community, on the other
hand, has a strong adverse effect on governance. In our theoretical model local financing
acts like a cost-sharing mechanism that distributes the burden of corruption throughout
the whole community and consequently we predicted a negative link between the two.
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Empirical results confirms this prediction; the coefficient in the local financing variable is
indeed negative, but it loses its significance in IV regressions.
When it comes to voice related variables, voter turnout is barely significant in
random effects estimation, and not significant in others. Participation in barangay
meetings becomes significant at the 5 percent with a negative sign when we control for
endogeneity of the voice variables. The third voice variable, involvement in community
activities has the correct sign in all three equations, but is not significant. We also created
a voice index by taking the average of aforementioned three voice variables for the poor
and the non-poor, respectively. Regression results reported in the last three columns
indicated that voices of both the poor and the non-poor reduce corruption in local
governments, but the latter tends to have more influence.
Turning to formal accountability mechanisms, we find that accountability index
we have created for municipal governments and frequency of audit by the central
government, which captures inter-governmental oversight, appear to be weakly related to
corruption. Finally, availability of private alternatives in the education and health care has
a positive but marginally significant influence over governance in the all three columns.
This suggests that exit mechanisms may curb corruption by putting competitive pressure
on local governments. We do not find any link between ethnic fractionalization and local
governance.
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Table 8: Municipality Level Regression Results on Corruption in Local Governments
Random
Effects
Ordered
Probit G2SLS
Random
Effects
Ordered
Probit G2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voter Turnout -0.2203(-1.66)*
-1.9726
(-1.14)
-0.1201
(-1.09)
Participation in barangay meetings -0.1564(-1.30)
-0.4721
(-1.08)
-0.3675
(-2.18)**
Involvement in PTA, mothers club, youth club, women
club, local welfare clubs, NGO
-0.1326
(-1.56)
-0.5692
(-1.30)
-0.0990
(-1.39)
Voice of the poor6
-0.1093
(-1.09)
-0.6225
(-1.43)
-0.3675
(-1.85)*
Voice of the nonpoor7
-0.2199
(-2.19)**
-1.9366
(-2.41)**
-0.4244
(-1.78)*
Hierarchical accountability mechanisms
-0.2984
(-1.88)*
-2.2869
(-2.04)**
-0.0401
(-1.39)
-0.3307
(-1.97)**
-2.3144
(-2.11)**
-0.0497
(-1.12)
Frequency of audit by the central government
-0.4209
(-2.01)**
-1.8154
(-1.47)
-0.2234
(-1.95)*
-0.4193
(-1.86)*
-1.6938
(-1.31)
-0.1930
(-1.87)*
Ratio of local revenues to local government expenditures
-0.1729
(-1.82)*
0.9303
(2.25)**
-0.2785
(-2.03)**
-0.1544
(-1.56)
0.8951
(2.14)**
-0.0537
(-1.71)*
Number of private elementary and secondary schools and
private health centers per capita (province average)
-0.3326
(-2.20)**
-2.0372
(-1.86)*
-0.1008
(-1.55)
-0.3609
(-2.33)**
-2.0782
(-1.88)*
-0.1293
(-1.70)*
Wealth inequality 0.5132(2.35)**
4.6607
(2.16)**
0.3843
(2.03)**
0.5088
(2.31)**
4.5803
(2.04)**
0.4173
(2.11)**
Ethnic fractionalization 0.1665(1.50)
1.3530
(1.67)
0.2432
(1.21)
0.1871
(1.63)
1.4138
(1.75)*
0.2671
(1.37)
Average wealth of the municipality -0.4777(-2.45)**
-2.5381
(-2.50)**
-0.4102
(-2.12)**
-0.5104
(-2.57)**
-2.4001
(-2.32)**
-0.4330
(-2.19)**
Population density 0.1206(1.01)
1.5994
(1.47)
0.0451
(0.31)
0.0867
(0.84)
1.3887
(1.25)
-0.0012
(-0.09)
Percent of population in urban area 0.0583(0.89)
2.0244
(1.89)*
0.0751
(1.15)
0.0770
(0.97)
2.1856
(1.93)*
0.1036
(1.22)
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N 64 64 64 64 64 64
F-test on significance of the model p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00
Breusch-Pagan test for random effects p=0.66 p=0.54 p=0.72 p=0.53
Hausman test on orthogonality condition p=0.99 p=0.97 p=0.99 p=0.99
Adj.  R square 0.36 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.23 0.27
1 Random effects model group observations by provinces.
2 Random effects model reports maximum likelihood results.
3 Elasticities around the mean are reported (except for ordered probit model).
4 Ordered probit model assumes observations are independent across groups (provinces) but not necessarily independent within groups. Dependent variable is divided into 5
categories.
5 t-statistics in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
6 Instruments for voter turnout, civic participation, and voice are four survey questions: following local events by the households, being informed about local events through local
officials, and knowing who vice-mayor is in the municipality.
7 First-stage F-statistic = 2.97 (voter turnout), 2.86 (civic participation), 3.21 (voice)
8 First-stage R2= 0.49 (voter turnout), 0.57 (civic participation), 0.62 (voice)
9 Cragg-Donald statistics: 4.12 (cutoff point: 7.11)
10 Voice of the poor is the average of three voice variables (voting in local elections, participating on barangay meetings, and involvement in community activities) for the group of
poor households.
11 Voice of the non-poor is the average of three voice variables (voting in local elections, participating on barangay meetings, and involvement in community activities) for the
group of non-poor households.
Overall, the empirical results gave us some evidence that both citizen voice and local
financing may be critical in reducing corruption in local governments.  Accountability
mechanisms in municipalities or oversight by central government are rather weakly successful in
promoting good governance. We did not find any evidence to suggest a positive or negative link
between exit mechanisms and corruption. Other critical variables explaining governance seems
to be prosperity of the community (a proxy for institutional development) and wealth inequality
(a proxy for the strength of the local elite).
4.4 Conclusion
We have tested the implications of our theoretical model in the Philippines, where local
government units have significant autonomy and responsibility in provision of basic services to
their jurisdictions.
The results are summarized in Tables 9-11. We did not find a strong direct link between
local financing and the quantity of publicly provided local goods. A possible explanation for this
finding is that the benefits of local financing is usually based on some form of a Tiebout
mechanism which may not be applicable to developing countries due to underdeveloped capital
markets and constraints on household mobility.  Nevertheless, one mechanism that may
strengthen the success of local financing is political participation of citizens. Although neither
voter turnout nor local financing alone was strong in general, their interaction was quite
significant.
Our empirical results also showed that local taxation may have an indirect impact on
policy choice through its positive influence on a person’s involvement in voice mechanisms.
Households are more likely to participate in barangay meetings if local public spending is
primarily financed by local sources. In addition, we also found that by spreading the cost of
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corruption to the whole community, local taxation may be an important policy instrument to
support good governance in the public sector.
Another important finding is that keeping the wealthier segments of communities in the
public sector as users of publicly provided services is critical for the success of local
governments. They would be more active in voice mechanisms (such as participating in meetings
with local public officials) if they use public services. Their mobilization and participation in
political activities would create benefits for the whole community, because they have more
ability to raise their voice against public officials as compared to the less wealthy households. In
this context, we found that availability of private alternatives in the health and education sectors
may even have an adverse effect on local governments, if the use of the exit option is confined to
the wealthy and thereby private alternatives effectively shield these households from the
mismanagement and corruption in local governments. In the Philippines, however, the teacher
staffing norm established by the central government has provided an indirect link between school
enrollment and promotion of school principals through a Niskanen-mechanism (i.e. budget-
maximizing bureaucrats) rather than Tiebout. We found that this mechanism, coupled with
availability of private schools to large segments of the population has created an institutional
environment where school administrators, facing competitive pressure from private schools, have
motivated to raise the quality of education, at least in secondary schools.
We also found, however, the decentralization is not a panacea. Communities with more
acute wealth inequalities are more likely to have less publicly provided goods, because the
friction between the have and have-not is transformed into a conflict between public good users
and private good users. When this conflict is coupled with undue influence of the local elite,
there could be a bias in favor of public services used by the wealthy.
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Table 9: Summary of Results -  Allocation of Publicly Provided Goods
Variable Measure Prediction of the model Empirical results on Education Empirical results on Health
Citizen voice Voter turnout Increases education and
health inputs/outputs
No effect No effect
Local financing Local revenues per
capita
Increases education and
health inputs and outputs
No direct effect on education inputs
or test scores. Its interaction with
voter turnout has positive effect on
the teacher-student ration in primary
school
Positive direct effect on the number of
doctors; no effect on immunization rates.
Its interaction with voter turnout has
positive effect on the number of nurses.
Influence and
connections by
the non-poor
Wealth inequality Increases education and
health inputs used by the
non-poor, decreases those
used by the poor
Negative on education inputs and
outputs
Negative on health inputs and outputs
Membership in labor
unions, trade,
agriculture or business
coop. by the non-poor
Increases education and
health inputs used by the
non-poor, decreases those
used by the poor
Increases the teacher-student ratio in
public primary schools. No effect on
public secondary schools. No effect
on test scores
Increases the number of doctors, but
lowers the number of nurses, midwives.
No effect on immunization rates.
Influence and
connections by
the poor
Membership in labor
unions, trade,
agriculture or business
coop. by the poor
Increases education and
health inputs and outputs
used by the poor
No effect No effect
Availability of
private
alternatives
Number of private
health centers and
private schools per
capita
Decreases education and
health inputs and outputs
No direct effect on inputs; its
interaction with the influence of the
non-poor has negative effect on
teacher-student ratio. Positive effect
on test scores in secondary schools.
Negative, but marginally significant effect
on inputs. Positive effect on immunization
rates.
Re-
distributional
conflicts
Ethnic fractionalization Decreases education and
health inputs and outputs
No effect on teacher-student ratios.
Negative effect on test scores.
Negative effect on the number of doctors;
negative, but marginally significant effect
on the number of nurses, midwives.
Marginally significant negative effect on
immunization rates.
Percent of population
over 60 years of age
Decreases education inputs;
increases health inputs
No effect No effect
Percent of population
under 15 years of age
Increases education inputs;
decreases health inputs
No effect Negative effect on immunization rates
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Table 10: Summary of Results  Participation in Voice Mechanisms
Variable Measure Prediction of
the model
Empirical results on
participation in barangay
meetings
Empirical results on
involvement in
community activities
Empirical results on
voting in local elections
Use of public
services
Use of public schools or
public health facilities
Positive effect Positive effect for the rich,
no effect for the poor
No effect No effect
Local financing Ratio of local revenues to
local government expenditures
Positive effect Positive effect for the rich,
positive but marginally
significant effect for the
poor
No effect No effect
Corruption Corruption in local
governments
Negative effect Negative effect for the
poor, no effect for the rich
Positive effect for the poor,
no effect for the rich
Negative effect for the
poor, no effect for the rich
Household
wealth
Ownership of selected durable
goods
Negative effect Positive effect for the poor,
inverse-U shape for the
rich
Positive effect for the poor,
inverse-U shape for the
rich
Positive effect
Household
education
High school or higher Positive effect Positive effect Positive effect
Urbanization Household resides in urban
area
Negative effect for the
poor and the rich
(marginally)
Negative effect for the
poor, no effect for the rich
Negative effect  for the
poor, positive for the rich
Ethnic Minority Household belongs to an
ethnic minority
Negative effect for the
poor, no effect for the rich
Negative effect for the
poor, no effect for the rich
Negative effect for the
poor, no effect for the rich
Home ownership Positive effect for the poor
(marginally) and the rich
Positive effect for the poor No effect
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Table 11: Summary of Results  Corruption in Local Governments
Variable Measure Prediction of the model Empirical results
Citizen voice Voter turnout Negative effect No effect
Participation in barangay meetings Negative effect Negative effect in IV estimation
Involvement in social organizations Negative effect No effect
Voice of the poor Average of voter turnout, participation in
barangay meetings, and involvement in
community initiatives
Negative effect Negative but marginally significant
effect in IV estimation
Voice of the rich Average of voter turnout, participation in
barangay meetings, and involvement in
community initiatives
Negative effect Negative
Accountability Accountability mechanisms in local
government units
Negative effect Negative effect
Frequency of audit by central
governments
Negative effect Negative effect
Local financing Ratio of local revenues to local
government expenditures
Negative effect Negative effect
Availability of private
alternatives
Number of private health centers and
private schools per capita
Positive effect Negative effect
Influence and
connections by the
non-poor
Wealth inequality Positive effect Positive effect
Re-distributional
conflicts
Ethnic fractionalization Positive effect No effect
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Appendix A
Country Background
The Philippines is a country of 70 million people who live upon thousands of
islands that lie between the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea22. The larger of these
islands have vast expanses of mountains and jungles that physically separate large
populations. The sheer geography of the Philippines necessitated some form of
decentralized or at least deconcentrated governance for centuries, but this was not always
combined with devolution of political authority.
The Philippine government is a unitary system comprised of the central
government and the local government units. The local government consists of three
levels: province/highly urbanized city, municipality/component city, and barangays. At
present there are 77 provinces, 20 highly urbanized cities, 45 component cities, 1536
municipalities and 41,300 barangays or neighborhoods23 24.
Province is the largest unit in the political structure of the Philippines. Composed
of a cluster of municipalities and/or component cities, the province is both a political and
corporate body, which is headed by an elected governor and a provincial legislature. Its
functions and duties in relation to its component cities and municipalities are generally
                                                
22 Some portions of the country background is from Azfar, Gurgur, and Meagher (2001).
23 These numbers change as new units are created or old ones combined (Miller, 1997).
24 Manasan (1992)
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coordinative and supervisory. They are mainly responsible for strategic planning and
decision making, leaving execution of policies to cities and municipalities.
There are three classes of cities in the Philippines: the highly urbanized, the
independent component cities which are independent of the province, and the component
cities which are part of the provinces where they are located and subject to their
administrative supervision. Consisting of more urbanized and developed barangays, the
city coordinates and delivers basic public services. Highly urbanized cities have a
population of at least 200,000 inhabitants. The cities are both headed by an elected mayor
and a legislative body.
Municipality is a political corporate body which consists of a number of less
urbanized barangays within its territorial boundaries. It performs the same role as the city
and also headed by an elected mayor and a legislative body.
Barangay is the smallest political unit into which cities and municipalities in the
Philippines are divided. It is the basic unit of the Philippine political system. It consists of
less than 1,000 inhabitants residing within the territorial limit of a city or municipality
and administered by a set of elective officials, headed by a barangay captain. It serves as
a primary planning and implementing unit of government, as well as a forum for people
to express their views and to settle local disputes.
Decentralization in the Philippines was mandated by the new democratic
constitution of 1987 which has allowed local government units to have the power to
create its own resources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees, and charges (subject to guidelines
and limitations of Congress), and to have a just share in national taxes. The Local
Government Code enacted in 1991 has devolved even broader taxing and revenue raising
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power and granted a larger share in national internal revenue taxes. The Code devolved
“basic services” to local governments—these include most health services along with
such infrastructure provision as school, clinic, and local road building The bulk of local
government taxes comes from the real property tax (which is reserved solely for local
governments) and the local business tax. The tax base of each of these taxes are defined
by Congress which also sets lower and upper limits on the tax rates. The provinces and
their constituent municipalities are each allowed to levy a basic tax on real properties
within their boundaries (in the range of 0.25-0.5 percent). In addition they are authorized
to collect an additional 1 percent tax on real property for the Special Education Fund,
which is earmarked exclusively for education. The share of local governments in national
internal revenues (Internal Revenue Allotment) has raised from 18 percent of the national
budget in 1996 to 24 percent in 2000. Ten percent of the Internal Revenue Allotment
goes to barangays, 45 percent to municipalities, 25 percent to cities, and 30 percent to
provinces using a distribution formula that gives 70 percent weight to population, 20
percent weight to land area, and 10 percent weight to equal sharing. Relative to GNP,
total local government revenues is around 2 percent as compared to 16 percent of the
national government. Locally generated revenues and inter-governmental transfers have
nearly an equal share in the total local government income. According to a study by the
World Bank provinces with high household income and large population are more likely
to raise more local revenue, whereas there is no apparent link between the level of
centrally provided grant funds and local revenue mobilization (World Bank, 1994).
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A.1 Health Care
The health system is characterized by a rough parity between private and public
sectors in terms of health expenditure, number of hospital beds and manpower –  thus
creating a truly mixed system. The centralized public system is composed of a vast
network of hospitals, clinics and health stations over the entire country, while the private
system of hospitals, outpatient clinics and private practitioners has a national coverage.
Implementation of Local Government Code has resulted in devolution of all the
Department of Health facilities at the local level and over half of its staff to local
governments. As a result all rural health units, barangay health stations and municipal
maternity clinics were devolved to municipal and barangay governments and all
provincial, district, and municipal hospitals were devolved to provincial governments.
Public health services and  hospital operations at these levels are no longer subject to
central financial or managerial control. In terms of the scope of health services, personnel
and facilities involved, the number of local governments participating, and the degree to
which authority is being decentralized, the experience stands out as one of the most
ambitious health decentralization initiatives ever undertaken in Asia (World Bank, 1994).
Primary health care is significantly devolved in the Philippines, with staff being
hired, fired, and paid (according to a nationally-defined scale, and mostly with central
grant funds) by the local governments. Many localities use their discretionary resources
to supplement the health staff salaries defined by the central government, while others
attempt to deal with fiscal shortfalls by hiring fewer or cheaper health staff. The Local
Government Code provides that provinces, cities, and municipalities are all to have health
officers as well as health boards (the barangays provide only minimal health services).
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The boards are to include chief executive of local government unit as chairman, the local
health officer as vice-chairman, a representative from the local legislature, a
representative of the private sector or non-governmental sector, and a representative of
the Department of Health. The authority of the health boards, however, is limited to an
advisory role with regard to health policy and standards, and to proposing the health
budget to the local legislature.
The assets and staff retained by the central government are concentrated in
hospital facilities at the regional and national level, the health delivery structure of the
National Capital Region, the central administrative offices in Manila, and the regional
health offices. The Department of Health retains key functions in regulation and
accreditation, health information and education, surveillance, research and national health
policy areas, and is charged with managing technical and financial assistance to local
governments.
The private health sector in the Philippines is composed of thousands of single-
proprietor outpatient clinics, over a thousand hospitals of all sizes and types ranging from
5-1,000 beds, thousands of stores selling drugs, several large chains of drug stores, and
uncounted thousands of traditional healers and birth attendants. Distribution of private
health facilities across the country is somewhat affected by variation of income level
across provinces. In recent years, however, the distribution has become more even.
Almost half the population has access to private health facilities or private doctors
(World Bank, 2001).
There is a relatively modest system of social health insurance in the Philippines,
launched in 1972. It is a compulsory program covering public and private salaried
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employees, retirees, and the self-employed. Enrollment, however, is well below its
potential, with only 4.6 million employees and their families covered out of a total target
group of 21.8 million employed. It accounts less than 5 percent of total spending on
health care.
A.2 Education
By constitution, the government is responsible for free public education in the
elementary and secondary level. The Philippine education system consists of a broad-
based basic education sub-sector that is largely provided by the public sector. The
government has been the dominant provider of basic education: the public sector
accounts for over 92 percent of total enrollment at the elementary level. In contrast, the
public sector has traditionally been a relatively small player at the secondary and tertiary
level. According to a World Bank report, the distribution of public school enrollment
becomes increasingly skewed in favor of the rich as the level of education rises (World
Bank, 2003). While 61 percent of public elementary school students come from poor
families, this figure goes down to 49 percent in the case of public secondary schools and
29 percent in public tertiary institutions. Between 1990 and 1996 public spending on
higher education increased at the expense of public spending on basic education. In
recent years, however, policy initiatives have resulted in a re-alignment of spending
priorities in favor of basic education.
Public education is centralized under the administration of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but with some (at times significant) local input.
Local governments are responsible for school building construction and repair and the
center is responsible for practically everything else, including policy, curriculum,
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personnel, and operations. Adjustments in the salaries of public school teachers in the late
1980s and most of the 1990s have made personnel expenditures the single biggest item in
the DECS budget. By 1997, the entry-level salary of a public school teacher was 70
percent higher than its private school counterpart. Since personnel salaries are accounted
for almost nine tenth of the central budget, maintenance, operations, and capital
expenditures are mostly left to local governments. Local governments still have broad
latitude in personnel management through three channels: (i) supplementing the salaries
paid by central government; (ii) paying the salaries of newly recruited teachers until they
are integrated in the DECS payroll; and (iii) recruiting permanent teachers over and
above the school staffing norms applied by DECS.
Local institutions with a formal role in education governance include the school
boards at provincial and municipal levels and the Parent-Teacher Community
Associations (PTCA) for each school. Members of school boards involve both elected
and appointed local officials as well as members of parent-teacher associations. As with
health, there are no fees charged (formally) in the school system, though parents have to
buy uniforms and pay modest PTCA fees. As envisioned in the Local Government Code,
DECS chooses local school teachers and administrators in consultation with local school
boards. Furthermore, while the budgeting of financial resources in particular is highly
centralized in the Philippines, the local share of education finance has grown. There is a
also major tax earmark for education, the Special Education Fund, which is funded yearly
by some portion of the proceeds of real property taxes collected by all municipalities
within the country. The use of the fund is under the control of local school boards.
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Private education plays an important role in the Philippines, particularly at the
secondary and tertiary levels. Private schools account for a substantial share of secondary
and tertiary schools (33 percent and 79 percent, respectively) and a modest share in
elementary schools (7 percent) (World Bank, 2001). Compared with the rest of Asia, the
relative size of the private sector in the Philippines is below average for primary and
above average for secondary and tertiary (Jimenez and Sawada, 2001). At the primary
level, the small private sector tends to provide higher-quality schools for the relatively
small proportion of households who have opted out of the public system. At the
secondary and tertiary levels, private school quality spans a wider range, from some of
the very best to some of the very worst. These institutions include non-profit schools run
by religious groups or non-sectarian foundations, as well as profit-making entities that
produce a substantial rate of return to their owners.
A program for Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private
Education (GASTPE) was launched in 1989. It was essentially designed to provide
financial assistance to students from lower income families enrolling in private high
schools and tertiary institutions. The appropriation for the program constitutes
approximately of 3 percent of DECS' recurrent budget. GASTPE support at the secondary
level is channeled through two different schemes: Tuition Fee Supplements (TFS), and
Educational Service Contracting (ESC). The TFS scheme subsidizes a portion of annual
tuition fees for students enrolled in private high schools. For the 1994/95 school year, the
number of beneficiaries was 644,000 (41 percent of total private enrollment at that level).
ESC is an innovative financing scheme designed to enable students to enroll in
participating private schools, in communities where there is no public high school, or
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where there is excess enrollment in existing public high schools. Private schools
participate in a voluntary basis, and must meet certain quality criteria. ESC funding was
provided to 187,000 secondary students (12 percent of private enrollment) during the
1994/95 school year. GASTPE plays a considerably less prominent role at the tertiary
level – less than 2 percent of private enrollment at that level (World Bank, 1996).
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Appendix B
Description of Survey Instruments
The 2000 IRIS Survey
The 2000 IRIS Survey consists of eight modules of surveys undertaken in the
Philippines by IRIS with financial assistance of the World Bank in the spring of 2000.
The sample covered 19 provinces and 80 municipalities from 11 regions. The sample
involves 1120 households; 80 municipal administrators, 80 municipal health officials and
80 municipal education officials; 19 provincial administrators, 19 provincial health
officials and 19 provincial education officials, 160 government health facility managers
and 160 school principals –some private (50) and some public (110). The sample of
households represents 19 provinces, 80 municipalities within them, and 301 barangays25
within those 80 municipalities. Households can be matched to either schools or health
facilities at the barangay level.
1999 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
The Annual Poverty Indicator Survey (APIS) is a nationwide sample survey
designed to provide information on the different indicators related to poverty. More
specifically, this survey gathers information for the 78 provinces and all cities and
                                                
25 Barangay is the smallest political unit into which cities and municipalities in the Philippines are
divided. It is the basic unit of the Philippine political system. It often consists of less than 1,000 inhabitants
residing within the territorial limit of a city or municipality and administered by a set of elective officials,
headed by a barangay chairman.
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municipalities of Metro Manila on the demographic and economic characteristics, health
status and education of the family members; awareness and use of family planning
methods; housing, water and sanitation condition of the families; availability of credit to
finance the family business or enterprise; and income and expenditures of the family. In
addition, it gathers information on the effect of the economic crisis in families and the
steps they had taken in response to these problems.
It is a joint undertaking of the National Statistics Office, World Bank Mission and
the United Nation Development Program.
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Appendix C
Description of Variables
Table 12: Description of Health Care and Education Inputs and Outputs
Variable Description
Percentage of infants (0-5 years old)
immunized against hepatitis, DPT,
measles/mumps/rubella and polio
Province average. Source: 1999 Demographic and Health Survey.
Percentage of student passing National
Elementary Assessment Test
National Elementary Assessment Test (NEAT) is designed to assess abilities and skills of 6th grade pupils in
all public and private elementary schools. Province average. Source: The Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports Statistical Bulletin for the 1999-2000 school year.
Percentage of student passing National
Secondary Assessment Test
National Secondary Assessment Test (NSAT) aims to assess abilities and skills of 4th year high school
students in all public and private secondary schools.  Province average. Source: The Department of Education,
Culture, and Sports Statistical Bulletin for the 1999-2000 school year.
Teacher-student ratio in public elementary
schools Province average. Source: National Statistical Coordination Board for the 1999-2000 school year.
Teacher-student ratio in public secondary
schools Province average. Source: National Statistical Coordination Board for the 1999-2000 school year.
The number of doctors in public sector per
capita
Province average. Source: Medical personnel per province from the Department of Health, 1999; province
population from 1995 Census-Based Population Projections reported by the National Statistical Coordination
Board.
The number of nurses, midwives, trained
birth attendants, and other medical
personnel in public sector per capita
Province average. Source: Medical personnel per province from the Department of Health, 1999; province
population from 1995 Census-Based Population Projections reported by the National Statistical Coordination
Board.
104
Table 13: Description of Variables from 2000 IRIS Survey
Variable Description
Accountability index for public health centers and
public schools
Based on 10 questions measuring the existence and enforcement of written targets, frequency of
evaluations, inventory control, and record-keeping. Source: Public Schools Survey and Health
Clinics Survey.
Age Source: Household Survey.
Corruption index
Average of corruption perceptions of public officials and households. For public officials, the
following questions are used: (1) Proportion of public officials who get paid but do not show up,
(2) Proportion of public officials who paid kickbacks to obtain their positions, (3) Bribery
happened in the last year, (4) Theft of funds happened in the last year, (5) Theft of supplies
happened in the last year, (6) Frequency of theft of funds, (7) Frequency of seeking informal
payments. Source Municipal Administrators, Municipal DECS, Municipal Health Officials,
Health Facility Workers, and Public School Principals Surveys. For households we use the
following two questions: (1) Have you ever seen or heard reports of municipal/city officials
involved in corruption?”, (2) “How common is the corruption in municipal/city government?”.
Source: Household Survey.
Education Whether the household has high school education or above. Source: Household Survey
Ethnic minority
Tagalogs and Cebuanos are the two main ethnic groups in the Philippines, comprising about 50
percent of the population, followed by Ilocana and Visaya (around 15 percent each). We consider
the remaining population, which involves over 30 ethnic groups, as ethnic minority. Source:
Household Survey.
Female Source: Household Survey.
Following local events/politics “Does your family follow national or local events and politics?”. Source: Household Survey.
Frequency of attending meetings with barangay officials
“In the past year, have people in your barangay met to request that officials address a specific
issue? (for example, improvement of health provision, local roads, water delivery etc.)”. Source:
Household Survey.
Frequency of audit at health centers and municipal
health services (public schools and municipal education
services) by central government
Frequency of visits by provincial or municipal officials. Source: Public Schools Survey and
Health Clinics Survey.
Home ownership Source: Household Survey.
Informed about local events from local officials “Is your main source of information about national events and politics local officials”. Source:Household Survey.
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Involvement in social organizations
Average involvement/association with the following organizations/groups/ activities: PTA,
mothers club, youth club, women club, local welfare clubs, non-governmental organizations, etc.
Source: Household Survey.
Knows who vice-mayor is “Is your main source of information about national events and politics local officials”. Source:Household Survey.
Married Source: Household Survey.
Number of children Source: Household Survey.
Rent/Profit earners Rent and profit as percent of household income. Source: Household Survey
Urban area Household live in urban area. Source: Household Survey.
Use of public health services
“Which health facility (public, private, self) do you use in case of illnesses experienced by any
family member?”; if the respondent chooses public health facility for at least one member of the
family, (s)he is considered as using public health facilities. Source: Household Survey.
Use of public primary schools
“What type of primary school (public, private) do you send your child(ren) to?”; if at least one
child is sent to public school, the household is considered as using public primary schools. Source:
Household Survey.
Use of public secondary schools
“What type of secondary school (public, private) do you send your child(ren) to?”; if at least one
child is sent to public school, the household is considered as using public secondary schools.
Source: Household Survey.
Wage-earners Wage as percent of household income. Source: Household Survey
Working in agriculture Agriculture income as percent of household income. Source: Household Survey
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Table 14: Description of Variables from Other Sources
Variable Description
Local financing Ratio of local revenues to local government expenditures. Source: 1998 AnnualFinancial Report of Local Governments.
Index of ethnic fractionalization One minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares. Source: The 2000Census of Population.
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or business
cooperatives Source: The 1999 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey.
Population density Population per km2. Source: The 2000 Census of Population.
Price level Consumer price index. Source: The National Statistics Office of the Philippines.
The number of private health facilities per capita
Source: The number of private health facilities from the National Statistical
Coordination Board, 1999; population data from 1995 Census-Based Population
Projections reported by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The number of private primary schools per capita
Source: The number of private schools from the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports, 1999; population data from 1995 Census-Based Population Projections
reported by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The number of secondary schools per capita
Source: The number of private schools from the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports, 1999; population data from 1995 Census-Based Population Projections
reported by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The proportion of elderly population The proportion of population 60 years of age or older. Source: The 2000 Census ofPopulation.
The proportion of school-age population The proportion of population 15 years of age or younger. Source: The 2000 Census ofPopulation.
Urbanization
Percent of population living in urban areas. In the Philippines, “urban” areas fall
under the following categories: (1) have a population density of at least 1,000 persons
per square kilometer, (2) at least six establishments (commercial, manufacturing,
recreational and/or personal services), (3) at least three of the following: town hall,
church, public plaza, market place, or public building. Source: The 2000 Census of
Population.
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Voter turnout Ratio of voter turnout to registered voters in 1995 local elections. Source: ThePhilippines Commission on Elections.
Wealth index
Created using principal component analysis based on the 2000 Census of Population
and Housing, which provides information on housing characteristics and household
assets.
Wealth inequality The ratio of standard deviation of wealth index within a community to average wealthindex in that community.
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Appendix D
Descriptive Statistics
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics on Health Care and Education Inputs and Outputs
Variable N Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Percentage of infants (0-5 years old)
immunized against hepatitis, DPT,
measles/mumps/rubella and polio
Province
average 114 76.251 17.682 59.216 91.234
Percentage of student passing National
Elementary Assessment Test
Province
average 114 78.395 17.789 51.480 89.747
Percentage of student passing National
Secondary Assessment Test
Province
average 114 69.387 21.236 41.091 87.299
Teacher-student ratio in public
elementary schools
Province
average 114 39.364 18.681 31.597 51.519
Teacher-student ratio in public
secondary schools
Province
average 114 51.598 22.697 35.996 64.961
The number of doctors in public sector
per 10,000
Province
average 114 1.5506 1.8802 0.6802 4.2377
The number of nurses, midwives,
trained birth attendants, and other
medical personnel in public sector per
capita
Province
average 114 4.7351 4.9326 1.1762 17.1.95
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Table 16: Description Statistics of Variables from 2000 IRIS Survey
Variable N Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Accountability index
Public schools
Private schools
Health clinics
Municipal average
110
50
128
80
0.7405
0.7278
0.7700
0.7458
0.0753
0.0852
0.0818
0.0764
0.4296
0.4667
0.5619
0.4290
0.8914
0.9078
0.9357
0.9032
Age
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
34.966
33.914
35.627
10.189
9.5762
10.509
16
16
17
84
84
77
Corruption index
(municipality level)
Household average
Public official average
Composite
81
81
81
0.2968
0.2493
0.2736
0.1633
0.1001
0.1060
0
0.0194
0.0277
0.75
0.4770
0.5530
Education
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.4796
0.3848
0.5317
0.2436
0.2396
0.2304
0
0
0
1
1
1
Ethnic minority
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.2658
0.3326
0.2081
0.2464
0.2658
0.2784
0
0
0
1
1
1
Female
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.8917
0.8825
0.8965
0.3108
0.3203
0.3043
0
0
0
1
1
1
Following local
events/politics
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.5859
0.4935
0.6429
0.4911
0.4859
0.4795
0
0
0
1
1
1
Frequency of
participating meetings
with barangay officials
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.4250
0.3281
0.5239
0.4929
0.5004
0.4847
0
0
0
1
1
1
Frequency of audit by
central government
Public schools
Private schools
Health Clinics
Municipal average
110
50
128
80
0.5742
0.2889
0.4915
0.5955
0.2398
0.2145
0.2910
0.2183
0
0
0
0.1333
1
0.8577
1
1
Home ownership
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.7758
0.5744
0.9122
0.4171
0.2855
0.1566
0
0
0
1
1
1
Informed about local
events from local officials
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.0912
0.0932
0.0849
0.2880
0.2854
0.2910
0
0
0
1
1
1
Involvement in social
organizations
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.0875
0.0615
0.1039
0.1261
0.0972
0.1389
0
0
0
1
0.5714
1
Knows who vice-mayor is
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.3478
0.2829
0.3887
0.3344
0.3658
0.3085
0
0
0
1
1
1
Married
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.9678
0.9745
0.9634
0.1766
0.1577
0.1875
0
0
0
1
1
1
Number of children
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
1.3148
1.3542
1.2900
1.2099
1.2382
1.1918
0
0
0
6
5
6
Rent/Profit earners
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.0367
0.0093
0.0540
0.4518
0.0958
0.2260
0
0
0
1
1
1
110
Urban
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.3757
0.3287
0.4053
0.4845
0.4703
0.4919
0
0
0
1
1
1
Use of public health
services
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.2282
0.1063
0.2758
0.4325
0.3198
0.4899
0
0
0
1
1
1
Use of public primary
schools (given that at
least one child goes to
school)
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
708
266
442
0.0624
0.0156
0.1188
0.2051
0.0864
0.2411
0
0
0
1
1
1
Use of public secondary
schools (given that at
least one child goes to
school)
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
349
80
269
0.2568
0.1047
0.3147
0.3548
0.2490
0.3990
0
0
0
1
1
1
Wage-earners
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.6932
0.6574
0.7157
0.4614
0.4715
0.4514
0
0
0
1
1
1
Working in agriculture
Household average
The poor
The non-poor
1118
432
686
0.2853
0.3241
0.2609
0.4517
0.4686
0.4394
0
0
0
1
1
1
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of Variables from Other Sources
Variable (province average) N Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Local financing 114 0.5298 0.2016 0.3533 0.6492
Index of ethnic fractionalization 114 0.6588 0.2941 0.2809 0.8511
Membership in labor unions, trade, agriculture or
business cooperatives 114 0.3416 0.1946 0.0270 0.8230
Population density (per km2) 114 86.653 23.145 35.154 119.87
Price level (national average = 1) 114 0.9684 0.2352 0.7465 1.1289
The number of private health facilities per 10,000 114 0.7824 0.9246 0.1355 1.9752
The number of private primary schools per 10,000 114 0.5715 0.4978 0.1098 1.2987
The number of secondary schools per 10,000 114 1.6489 0.9716 0.2401 3.9814
The proportion of elderly population 114 0.0775 0.1260 0.0451 0.1179
The proportion of school-age population 114 0.2401 0.1057 0.1978 0.2841
Urbanization 114 0.6270 0.3054 0.1209 0.9584
Voter turnout 114 0.7710 0.2198 0.5117 0.8866
Wealth index 114 0.4106 0.2574 0.1977 0.6985
Wealth inequality 114 0.4702 0.2016 0.2057 1.2066
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